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The Sociology of Soviet Law: The
Heuristic and "Parental"Functions*
James L. Hildebrand
Whoso would undertake to give institutions to a People must
work with full consciousness that he has set himself to change,
as it were, the very stuff of human nature; to transform each
individual who, in isolation, is a complete but solitary whole,
into a part of something greater than himself, from which, in
a sense, he derives his life and his being; to substitute a communal and moral existence for the purely physical and independent life with which we are all of us endowed by nature.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

C HE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW refers, broadly, to that area of
1
inquiry which attempts to darify the functions of the law and

the legal system within an ongoing society.

"The broad aim of

legal sociology is the extension of knowledge regarding the foundations of legal order, the pattern
of legal change and the contriHa AUTHoR: JAmE s L. HLDEBRAND
(A.B.,

Hamilton

College; J.D., Case

Reserve University; S.J.D.
Candidate, Harvard University) is a
member of the Ohio Bar and, while associated with a Cleveland law firm, is
currently completing a 2-year apprenticeship with a law firm in Tokyo,

Western

Ja a.

bution of law to the fulfillment
of social needs and aspirations." 2
The sociology of Soviet law
might thus be defined generally
as the study of the social functions of law within the Soviet

legal system. It is the purpose of this article to outline a sociological approach to the study of legal systems and a typology of
the functions of law, providing the basis for an analysis of the Soviet
legal system as well as other legal systems. The application of this
typology in the analysis of the Soviet legal system will be limited,
in this article, to the heuristic and "parental" functions of law and
the underlying effect that an avowed ideology and political philosophy have on these functions.
* This article is a modification of a chapter to appear in J. HILDEBRAND, SoCtoLEGAL ESSAYS TowARD AN INTERACTIONAL THEORY OF LAW.

All rights of future

publication of this article are reserved by the author.
The author wishes to thank Professor Harold J.Berman, of the Harvard Law
School, for reading the manuscript as well as for his valuable comments.
1

Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SociAL CONTRAcr: ESSAYS BY LoCKE, HuME,
AND ROUSSEAU 205 (G. Hopkins transl. 1962).
2 Selznick, The Sociology of Law, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SocIAL SCIENCES 50 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
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THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

Sociological analysis opens up the boundaries of law and legal
reasoning by emphasizing the primacy of the social context and by
seeking to determine the distinctively legal either outside the formally
recognized legal system 3 or synergistically within the interaction between the formal legal system and the basically nonlegal sociocultural system. This latter interactional system will be referred to
herein as the sociolegal system.
The development of a sociological orientation within legal theory
and legal systems analysis has been the product of the creative and
constructive thinking of numerous jurists as well as sociologists.'
Most current sociologies of law, however, can be criticized for limiting their analysis to primitive or "prelegal" social systems, overlooking the need for the application of such analysis to modern
sociolegal systems.
Sociological legal theory has arisen not merely as a protest against
traditional concepts of natural right theory, but also as a reaction to
the more formalistic attitudes of analytical jurisprudence. Analytical positivism, for example, takes as its starting point a given (empirically observed) legal order and distills from this legal order certain
fundamental notions, concepts, and distinctions. This distillation
may then be compared with similarly derived fundamental notions,
concepts, and distinctions of other legal systems in order to ascertain
common elements. As Professor Julius Stone has noted, analytical positivism is primarily interested in "'an analysis of legal terms
and an inquiry into the logical interrelations of legal propositions. ' 5
But legal positivism may also take a sociological form:
3Id. at

51.

4

See generally E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND
METHOD OF LAw 103-25 (1962); S.NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL
PERSPECTIVE (1969); E. SCHUR, LAw AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW (1968);
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY READINGS (R. Simon ed. 1968); auth-

orities cited note 9 infra.
5

J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 31 (1961).

As representative

of this approach, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961). As the spokesman
for a modernized form of analytical positivism, Professor H. L. A. Hart has tried to

develop a "concept of law" more balanced than that presented by Austin and Kelsen
(See generally J. AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMiNED (H.LA. Hart

ed. 1954); Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARv.
L. REV. 44 (1941) ), by recognizing the element of centralized authority but also stressing the special qualities of obligation intrinsic to legal phenomena. As a criticism of
Austin and Kelsen, Hart observed that even the most "positive" of legal systems is not a
self-contained whole and that legal rules are often vague at their periphery. When the
implementation or interpretation of legal values becomes unclear, recourse must be
taken to considerations of social aim and policy. Professor Hart stated: "In every legal
system a large and important field is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts

19711

SOCIOLOGY OF SOVIET LAW

Sociological positivism undertakes to investigate and describe the
various social forces which exercise an influence upon the making
of positive law. It is concerned with analyzing not the legal rules
produced by the state, but the sociological factors responsible for
their enactment. It shares with analytical positivism a purely empirical attitude toward the law and a disinclination to search for
and postulate ultimate values in the legal order.6
"How does law differ from and how is it related to orders backed

by threats? How does legal obligation differ from, and how is it
related to, moral obligation? What are rules and to what extent is
law an affair of rules ?-7 These are questions asked by the analytical jurist. Why do people have legal rules and law ideas? How is
their content formed? I-low and why does this content change?
In what ways do legal rules and law ideas influence social conduct?
"What actually happens in a community owing to the probability
and other officials in rendering initially vague standards determinate, in resolving the
uncertainties of statutes, or in developing and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authoritative precedents." H.LA. HART, supra at 132.
Of course, vagueness and indeterminancy may serve a systemic function - for example, by allowing for change - and may be purposefully programmed into a legal system. "The open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much
must be left to be developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of
circumstances, between competing interests which vary in weight from case to case."
Id. Professor Hart has also stated:
In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between two social needs: the
need for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied
by private individuals to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an
informed, official choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and
settled when they arise in a concrete case. Id.at 127.
See Hart, Positivism and the Separatio of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L REV. 593,

608-10 (1958).

It can be argued, however, that Hart's analysis of the open texture of law and the
application of the rule of law does not go far enough. In an attempt to justify a modernized version of Austin's imperative legal theory, Hart views law entirely in terms of
its formal source, rather than as a complex and interactional undertaking capable of
varying degrees of success and evaluation. Concerning this aspect of Hart's analysis,
Professor Lon L. Fuller has stated:
There is no recognition [in H.L.A. Harts The Concept of Law) that there
may be a continued public acceptance of a single source of legal power and
yet that power may be so ineptly or corruptly exercised that an effective legal
system is not achieved. Nor is there any recognition that some degree of
"pathology" attends all legal systems, including the most exemplary. Even if
one is interested only in shifts from one formal source of legal power to another, no realistic account can be given if problems of legal morality are
excluded. In the course of history lawfully established governments have
been overthown [sic] in the name of law. The threat of lawless revolution
can make it difficult to maintain lawfulness in the actions of a government
genuinely dedicated to legality. L. FULLER, THE MoR.ALITY OF LAW 157
(rev. ed. 1969).
See also G. GOTrLIB, THE LOGiC OF CHOICE 125 (1968).
6 E. BODE4HEIMER, supra note 4, at 93.
7 H.L.A. HART, supra note 5, at 13.
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that persons participating in the communal activity, especially those
wielding a socially relevant amount of power over the communal
activity, subjectively consider certain norms as valid and practically
act according to them, in other words, orient their own conduct towards these norms ?"' These are questions asked by the sociological
jurist.
Traditionally, law has been viewed as performing three major
roles or functions in society: (1) the institutional role, which includes allocation of authority or power and provides for ascertaining
rules of accepted behavior and the delimiting of sociolegal relationships; (2) the conflict resolution role, which provides for the orderly
application of the legal rules; and (3) the interpretational role,
which includes the provision for sociolegal change and the redefining of social relationships. But our analysis need not stop here
since sociological and behavioralistic studies of and approaches to
legal analysis may provide even greater insights into the synergistic
or interactional aspects of law within a functioning and ongoing
legal system, including such phenomena as the reciprocal nature of
social control within a legal system, the relatively positive attributes
of some forms of social deviance, the social function of reason, and
the means for and the effects of progressive sociolegal change.'
8
M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 11 M(. Rheinstein ed., E. Shils &
M. Rheinstein transls. 1954).
9 The major problem in the area of legal sociology continues to be the lack of a
comprehensive integration of jurisprudence and social research. One commentator has
noted: "Unless jurisprudential issues of the nature and functions of law, the relation of
law and morals, the foundations of legality and fairness, and the role of social knowledge in law are addressed by modern investigators, the sociology of law can have only
a peripheral intellectual importance." Selznick, supra note 2, at 56. See also Selznick,
The Sociology of Law, in 1 SOCIOLOGY TODAY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 115 (R.
Merton, L. Broom & L. Cottrell eds. 1959).
Recent studies have been conducted concerning such topics as the law's role in
creating social deviance and the relatively positive functions of social conflict. See, e.g.,
H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963); L. COSER,
THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956). See also D. MATZA, BECOMING DEVIANT (1959); Salem & Bowers, Severity of Formal Sanctions as a Deterrent to Deviant
Behavior, 5 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 21 (1970). Furthermore, increasingly new insights
are being provided by sociological and anthropological studies concerning the law and
social conduct of primitive peoples. See, e.g., CHANGING LAW IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (J. Anderson ed. 1963); M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG
THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODISIA (2d ed. 1967); M. GLUCKMAN, POLITICS,
LAw AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY (1965); A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE
MAN (1954). See also TRADITIONAL AND MODERN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA
AND AFRICA (D. Buxbaum ed. 1965). These and similar studies require assessment
in terms of their significance for modern social development within a "rule of law."
See generally T. BECKER, POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
(1964); H. BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD (1969);
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (G. Schubert & D. Danelski eds. 1969); FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE STRENGTH AND LIMITS OF FUNCTIONALISM
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As Professor Robert Merton has stated: "Sociology need not make
men wise or even prudent. But, through its successive uncovering
of latent social problems and through its clarification of manifest
social problems, sociological inquiry does make men increasingly accountable for the outcome of their collective and institutionalized
actions."' 0
For the most part the theories of sociological jurisprudence to
date have treated law as a passive rather than an active agent in
social change. From this perspective, law is viewed merely as responding to new circumstances and social pressures; it is not seen in
its heuristic, educational, and opinion-creating roles. Obviously,
this same feeling pervades the other schools of jurisprudential
thought to an even greater degree. But such a view is becoming increasingly less tenable, especially in recent years, as the great social
effects of legal change within the legal systems throughout the world
have become too obvious to be ignored. The question is no longer
whether law is a significant vehicle of social change; rather the questions are how it so functions, what the special problems are that
arise, and how society can plan for optimal systemic legal change.
In a sense, laws and legal change constitute an important social
reality."
In contradistinction to the "New Analytical Juristic Movement,"
which is developing with H. L. A. Hart as the avowed leader, 2 a
"new sociology of law," which emphasizes an "interactional theory
IN ANTHROPOLOGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND SOCIOLOGY (D. Martindale ed. 1965); C. GANONG & R. PEARCE, LAW AND SOCIETY (1965); JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH (G. Schubert ed. 1964); Kalven, The
Quest for the Middle-Range: EmpiricalInquiry and Legal Policy, in LAW IN A CHANGING
AMERICA 56 (G. Hazard ed. 1968); LAw AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (L Friedman & S. Macaulay eds. 1969); D. MARTINDALE, THE NATURE AND TYPES OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1960); W. MITCHELL, SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND POLITICS:
THE THEORIES OF TALcoTr PARSONS (1967); MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST (W. Bucldey ed. 1968); T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM,
chs. Vl & VII (1951); T. PARSONS, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETIES
(1960); THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw: INTERDISCIPLINARY READINGS (R. Simon ed.
1968); SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: SELECTED READINGS (V. Aubert ed. 1969); J. STONE,
LAw AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1966).
10 Merton, Social Problems and Sociological Theory, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 697, 710 (R. Merton & R. Nisbet eds. 1961). Similarly, the problems
which are brought before the legal profession involve "questions of economics, politics,
and social policy which legal training cannot solve unless law includes all social knowledge." M.COHENREAONANDLAW83-84 (1950).
"1 "Reality, then, in this distinctively human world, is not a hard immutable thing
but is fragile and adjudicated - a thing to be debated, compromised, and legislated."
G. MCCALL & J. SIMMONS, IDENTITIES AND INTERACTIONS 42 (1966). See generally
L. FULLER, supra note 5, at 194-95.
12 See Summers, The New Aal4,tical jurists, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 861 (1966). See
also L FULLER, supra note 5, at 190-91.
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of law," is developing in the United States.'3 It is the purpose of
this article to further the understanding of the insights available
from this latter jurisprudential development by providing an interactional interpretation of the heuristic and "parental" functions of
certain aspects of Soviet law.
Today there is a need for a new synthesis springing from an
interdisciplinary analysis of the sociology of law and for a new
typology of the basic functions of a legal system. It may be useful,
therefore, in understanding the sociological obligations inherent in a
legal system, to expand the traditional view of the role and functions
of law to include those functions of social change and social conformity which are made evident by viewing law and the legal system
from a new sociological and human interactional perspective.
In constructing a new typology of legal functions, our concern
lies not in whether the definitions of these sociolegal functions are
necessarily "true" or "false," or even whether they exist as ideal types
within the Soviet legal system,1" but rather in whether increased insights can be achieved through the application of such a sociolegal
typology. The approach required for constructing a new typology
is that of the conceptual pragmatist, which requires that questions
"posed by any science as to the meaning of a term can be answered
only if the intention is to ask what in this particular science ought to
be understood by this particular term (or other symbol)."" This
approach dictates that
13 Recent publications of Professor Fuller reflect this new development in jurisprudence. See L FULLER, supra note 5, at 193-95, 237; Fuller, Human Interaction and the
Law, in LAW AND JUSTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
(to be published); Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in 11 NOMOS, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 3 (1969).
14 The Soviet writers do not use the phrase "parental law." However, there is
great stress in Soviet legal literature on the educational role of Soviet law, and
here the word "educational" . . . has a very wide connotation, implying rearing
or upbringing. Whatever the particular word used, the crux of the matter is
the focus on the role of law in the upbringing of the people. H. BERMAN,
JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOvIET LAw 423 n.6
(rev. ed. 1963).
Compare Tumanov, Failure to Understand or Unwillingness to Understand?: (On
Harold Berman's Justice in the U.S.S.R.: An Interpretation of Soviet Law), Sovetskoe
gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 8, 1965, translatedin 4 SovIET LAW AND Gov NMEN', No.
3, Winter 1965, at 3, 8-9, with Berman, A Reply to V.A. Tumanov, 4 SOvIET LAW AND
GOVERNMENT, No. 3 Winter 1965, at 11, 15.
15H. KANTOROWICZ, THE DEFINITION OF LAw, 5 (A. Campbell ed. 1958). The
term "conceptual pragmatism" was coined by Herman Kantorowicz, who carefully distinguished it from "pragmatism" as follows: "This 'conceptual pragmatism' must be
distinguished from what is usually called 'pragmatism' (better 'propositional pragmatism'), that is the sophistical mischievous doctrine of tending to identify the truth of
any proposition with its usefulness for some practical purpose." Id. at 90 n.8.
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every definition ought to be taken as meaning "I propose to understand by this term such and such, and if, dear reader, you wish
to understand by the same term something else, you are free to do
so provided that you do not read your definition into my words.
The value of our respective definitions must be judged by their
comparative usefulness."16

Unlike the verbal realist, who is primarily concerned with whether a
definition is true or false, the conceptual pragmatist is interested in
whether a definition or, as in this case, a typology is useful or useless.
The sociological functions of law and the legal system can
be grouped under the following nine headings: (1) coercive role,
which can be divided into the proscriptive function of law - that
is, law as a statement of what not to do - and the prescriptive function - that is, law as a statement of how to act "rationally" within
the constructs of accepted communal behavior; (2) distributive
function - that is, law as a means for defining and delimiting
sociolegal relationships; (3) integrative function - that is, law as
a means for conflict resolution and the settlement of interpersonal
and intergroup disputes; (4) psychological function - that is, law
as a means for creating and maintaining the psychological and behavioral mentality or frame of reference necessary for the continuance of the sociolegal system; (5) legitimizing function - that is,
law as a means for "legalizing" both the existing sociolegal system
and planned future systemic change; (6) homeostatic function that is, law as a means for pattern maintenance and for equilibrating
dysfunctional fluctuations caused by systemic change; (7) educational and "parental" function - that is, law as a means for channelling and rechannelling societal interests and values as well as a
means for guiding social behavior; (8) heuristic function - that is,
law as a force for creating and stimulating opinion; and (9) selfactualizing function - that is, law as a means for the positive creation of a statement of rules for orderly sociolegal change and as a
means for goal attainment within the context of planned or proThree main schools of modern pragmatism exist today: (1) "empirical pragmatism,"
which emphasizes the significance of immediate experience and views knowing as a
sufficient reading of one set of experiences into another set; (2) "instrumentalism,"
which ascribes a larger role to concepts and defines knowledge as consisting of patterns
of concepts that serve as tools for the satisfactory resolution of situations evoking tension; (3) "conceptual pragmatism," which draws more sharply the situations between
immediate experience and concepts and, viewing experience as fundamental, applies
pragmatic criteria only to the concepts. See T. HILL, CONTEMPORARY TkoRIES OF
KNOWLEDGE 295 (1961).
See also C.W. MILLS, SOCIOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM (I.
Horowitz ed. 1964).
16 H. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 15, at 9. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the FunctionalApproach, 35 CoLum. L. REv. 809,835-36 (1935).
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grammed change. Obviously, within an ongoing sociolegal system
these nine functions overlap one another as well as interact within
the general typology presented here. Furthermore, the sociolegal
system as a whole is greater, in the Gestalt sense, than the sum of its
components. Nomothetically,' 7 and as shown in figure 1 below,
these nine sociolegal functions can be divided into groups of three
under the general headings of present-perspective, past-retentive,
and future-directive, or, similarly, pragmatic, static, and dynamic.
(Admittedly, this latter classification would be viscerally repugnant to the verbal realist.)
FIGURE 1

Tentative Typology for the New Sociology of Law
A. Present-Perspective
(Pragmatic Aspect)
1. Coercive Role
a. Proscriptive Function
2.

b. Prescriptive Function
Distributive Function

3. Integrative Function

B.

Past-Retentive
(Static Aspect)
1. Psychological Function
2. Legitimizing Function
3.

Homeostatic Function

C. Future-Directive
(Dynamic Aspect)
1. Educational and
"Parental" Function
2. Heuristic Function
Function
3. Self-Actualizing

17 The terms "nomothetic" and "'idiographic," originally coined by W. Windelband,
are now frequently used to differentiate the general, systemic, or law-like from the
individual, ego-referent, or unique. See G. ALLPORT, PATTEM AND GROWTH IN
PERSONALITY 8-9 (1961), citing W. WINDELBAND, GEscHicTE uND NATURWISSENSHAFiT (1904).
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The concern of the remainder of this discussion will be to clarify
certain sociological implications inherent in the above typology, not
only for an understanding of the Soviet legal system, but also for an
increased awareness of the role and functions of law within any
dynamic social system. Although the Soviet legal system is unique
in the overt emphasis it places on the educational and guidance functions of law, it is submitted that heuristic and "parental" functions
exist in all legal systems with varying degrees of prominence.'
The heuristic function of law is that aspect of a legal system by
which individual or collective opinions concerning social and legal relationships are created or stimulated through the interaction that
takes place between the law and social behavior. It might also be
called the "propagandistic" function - in the positive as well as negative sense of the word. The ideology and avowed political philosophy of a social system, as well as its practiced variations, can affect
to a large measure the heuristic function of law within that system. 9
The extent to which the heuristic function is emphasized in a socioI8 Professor Berman has noted

that many of the most important features of the Soviet
legal system "are neither uniquely socialist nor uniquely Russian but are rather a product of a social philosophy which - though entirely congenial to both socialism and the
Russian heritage - is to be found in other nonsocialist countries as well." H. BERMAN,
supra note 14, at 279.
In discussing the American legal system, Karl Llewellyn observed that "our own
law moves steadily in a parental direction." K Llewellyn, Lectures on Jurisprudence
(mimeographed, 1948), discussed in H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 284, 421 n.6. See
also H. MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JusTicE AND SociAL RECONSTRUCTION 199-207
(1946); Estep, The Legislative Process and the Rule of Law: Attempts to Legislate
Taste in Moral and Political Beliefs, 59 McH. L REV. 575 (1961); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: ProfessionalTraining in the Public Interest,
52 YALE L.J. 203 (1942); Moore & Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in
Legal Control,53 YALE UJ. 1 (1943).
19 For an excellent discussion of the ideological differences of perspective that juristic
political scientists bring to bear upon their teaching, research, and writing, see Schubert,
Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication, 61 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 106 (1967).
See also A. GYORGY & G. BLAcKwOOD, IDEOLOGIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1967);
Mendelson, The Neo-BehavioralApproach to the JudicialProcess: A Critique, 57 AM.
POL. Scr. REv. 595 (1963); Miller, On the Interdependence of Law and the Behavioral
Sciences, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 1094 (1965).
With respect to the self-actualizing function, political ideology can also have a conservative effect on the systemic behavior of the sociolegal system; for example, the
idealized tenets of a pluralistic democracy may create dilemmas in effectuating "legal"
foreign policies as well as ideologically compatible domestic policies. See J. HILDEBRAND, SOvIET INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXEMPLAR FOR OPTIMAL DECISION THEORY ANALYSIS, chs. IV & VIII (1968); C. LINDBLOOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965); Q. WRIGHT, PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 275 n.6 (1954). For an analysis of the tendency of "legalistic
thought" to assume, promote, and enforce an ideology of consensus and agreed-upon
rules, see J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964). See also Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 381 (1965); Selznick, supra note 2, at 54;
Swett, CulturalBias in the American Legal System, 4 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 79 (1969).
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legal system depends upon the effect of ideological, cultural, and
traditional constructs upon the "content" of law of the general
societal system.
The notion of the educational and "parental" function of law
focuses on the role of law as a guiding teacher and parent. The
'parental" aspect of Soviet law and the Soviet legal system has
been
described by Professor Harold J. Berman as follows:
Implicit in the Soviet legal system is a new conception of the role
of law in society and of the nature of the person who is the subject of law. The Soviet legislator, administrator, or judge plays
the part of a parent or guardian or teacher; the individual before
the law, "legal man," is treated as a child or youth to be guided
and trained and made to behave. I have called this the "parental"
aspect of Soviet law, though it should be understood at the outset
that the concept of parentalism does not necessarily imply benevo20
lence.

Professor Berman's analysis of the "parental" nature of Soviet
law provides an excellent - and to date unsurpassed - sociological
description of that particular sociolegal function. As shown in
figure 2 below, however, the "parental" or educational function can
be viewed as either unidirectional,as it is generally conceived in the
Soviet Union and in most other legal systems, or as interactional
within the general societal system.
In this article, the concept of the "parental" function of law is
not limited to the unidirectional and institutional concept of "parental" law - that is, the state being parent to the citizen - put
forth by Professor Berman:
To speak of "parental law" is therefore not so much to describe
the state which proclaims and applies the law as to describe the
assumptions which are made regarding the nature of the citizen
and his relationship to the state. To say that under Soviet law the
state has extended the range of its interests and its powers is not
enough. The state has sought in law a means of training people

to fulfill the responsibilities now imposed on them - and it has
made this function of law central to the whole legal system. 21
In contrast, the "parental" function of law is conceived in this article
as an interactional phenomenon, and it is submitted that this interactional perspective more closely approximates reality in almost any
given legal system - the child is often father (or parent) to the
man (or the state).
20

H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 6. The "parental" aspect of Soviet law has also
been discussed under the heading of "paternalism." See, e.g., Campbell, The Legal
Scene: Proceduralistsand Paternalists,57 SURVEY: A JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND EAST
EUROPEAN STUDIEs, No. 5, Oct. 1965, at 55-66.
21 H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 284.
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FIGURE 2

The Unidirectional and InteractionalPerspectives
Parental Function
Parental Function
(unidirectional)
(interactional)
LAW ->BEHAVIOR
LAW
BEHAVIOR
Parental Function
(interactional)

When paradigmed on a time-scale, the interactional perspective
of the sociolegal system assumes an ever-increasing synthesis and
integration as shown in figure 3 below. This effect is representative
of sociolegal systemic change, or what Alfred Korzybski has referred
2
to as man's time-binding capacity.
FIGURE 3

Paradigm for Time-Scale Representation of the InteractionalPerspective
Law.

Behavior,

-

0 Behaviorl

Law2

Lawn

Behavior.

This increasing synthesis and integration, which is also the social
function of reason, should not be limited in its goal to the technocratic slogan of "prediction and control," but ought to include reasoned moral choice - which, in the area of sociolegal change, further accentuates the interactional perspective. The Soviet legal sys22

See A. KoRzYBsia, MANHOOD OF HumANiTY 91-92 (1921).
Admittedly, the time-scale representation in figure 3 lacks the general systems theory
concept of goal-changing feedback, which Professor Karl W. Deutsch has defined as
including "feedback readjustments . . . of those internal arrangements which implied
[the system's] ... original goal, so that the net will change its goal, or set itself new
goals which it will now have to reach if its internal disequilibrium is to be lessened."
Deutsch, Some Notes on Research on the Role of Models in the Natural and Social
Sciences, 7 SYNTHESE 506, 515 (1948-1949). See also J. HILDEBRAND, supra note 19,
at 102-03 n.333, 121-28; Maruyama, The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying
Mutual Causal Processes, 51 AM. SCIENTIST 164 (1963). Figure 3 could be modified
to represent a simple systems analysis, however, by drawing feedback loops from Law.
to Law2, Law,, and Behaviori, and from Behaviorn to Behavior 2, Behaviori, and Law,.
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tern, like most Western legal systems, does not expressly recognize
this social function of reason, but rather stresses (in the unidirectional sense) the role of "socialist law" in implementing preestablished ideological constructs.
In addition to the heuristic and "parental" functions, the Soviet
legal system can also be characterized by the emphasis placed on the
self-actualizing function of law, that is, the role of law as a means
for the positive creation of a statement of rules for orderly sociolegal
change and as a means for goal attainment within the context of
planned or programmed systemic change. The ideology and political philosophy of Soviet-Marxism are based on a relative concept of
the perfectability of man; and, to a certain extent, it is through
the operation of the interim or transitional legal system of socialist
law that the goal of "true" communism and public self-government
is hoped to be attained in the Soviet Union. It should be stressed
again that the concern herein is not whether the definitions of these
sociolegal functions, such as the self-actualizing function, are necessarily "true" or "false," or even whether they exist as ideal types
within the Soviet legal system. Our ultimate concern is whether
increased understanding and new insights can be achieved through
the application of this sociolegal typology.
To a large extent, the analysis of the heuristic and "parental"
functions of law within the Soviet system, as presented herein, will be
based on empirical and subjective observations made by Harold
J. Berman, John N. Hazard, Vladimir Gsovski, George C. Guins,
Rudolf Schlesinger, and other experts in the field of Soviet law
and legal theory. The author is responsible, however, for the interpretation placed on these observations. This article does not pretend to be a comprehensive description of the Soviet legal system;
rather it is meant to be an interpretation of a particular sociolegal
aspect of that system.
III.

THE MARXIAN CLASS CONCEPT OF LAW

COMPARED WITH WEBER'S SOCIOLOGICAL
CONCEPT OF LAW

The relative prominence of the heuristic and "parental" functions
of law within a particular legal system can depend, to a large extent,
upon the underlying and avowed ideology and political philosophy
of the complex social system. This is also true of the self-actualizing
function. Of course, other factors such as cultural heritage, national
outlook, ethnocentricity, size, power, and even geographical posi-
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tion can and do influence the functions of law within the particular
system. The Soviet legal system with its avowed acceptance of the
Marxian theory of law provides a useful context for describing the
relationships which exist between an avowed ideology and the heuristic and 'parental" functions of law within the particular sociolegal system.
An understanding of the Marxian concept of law is essential to
understanding the Soviet adaptations and revisions of Marx's scientific approach to social problems and the effect that the resulting
Soviet ideology has had on the domestic sociolegal system within
the Soviet Union. The following statement by Professor Timothy
A. Taracouzio provides an appropriate introduction to this discussion:
The communist rearrangement of the whole social order en large
is one of its most important characteristics. In the non-proletarian
revolutions the newly introduced economic forms are based on the
familiar principles of the capitalistic interpretation of individualism, whereas the socialist revolution is confronted with the problem of a drastic transition from the capitalistic social order to the
socialistic structure of a community of men, which problem is
proportionally more difficult in a backward country. Confronted
with the problem of a drastic reconstruction of the whole social
order, the Soviet state had to disregard all existing principles of a
capitalistic regime, and to invent its own rules for administering
the new proletarian social order. It is needless to emphasize that
a new conception of law had to be inventedPm
The Marxian view of law as a product of evolving economic
forces can be placed generally in the historical and evolutionary
schools of jurisprudential thought. As did Hegel, Marxian theory
views history and man's evolving social structure as a continuous
struggle between opposing forces. These forces, however, are not
ideas as under Hegelian theory; rather they are material forces.24
23

Taracouzio, The Law it the Union of Socialist Sopiet Republics, 5 CHINA L. REV.

127, 135 (1932).
24
See E.BODENHEIMER, supra note 4, at 79. For Marx an idea "is nothing else

than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of
thought." 1 K. MARX, CAPITAL 25 (S. Moore & E.Aveling transls. 1906). Note also
the following statement by Marx and Engels:
The question whether objective truth is an attribute of human thought - is
not a theoretical but a practicalquestion. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the
reality and power, the "this-sidedness" of his thinking in practice. The dispute
over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a
purely scholasticquestion. K. MAI & F. ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY
197 (R. Pascal ed. 1968).
For a discussion of Marx and Engels' concept of law, see H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at
15-24; G. COuNTS, THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET EDUCATION 212-41 (1957); C. FRIEDRICH, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECrIVE 143-53 (1958); 1 V. GSOVSKI,
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According to Marx, all manifestations of social life, including legal
relationships, result from economic phenomena, and law is an
ideological superstructure erected above an economic basis.
At the risk of oversimplification, the following section will attempt to outline the theoretical bases of Marxian social theory as it
relates to the Marxian concept of law. For the purposes of this discussion, Marxian legal theory will be separated into three important
doctrines: (1) the economic determination of law; (2) Marxian
class analysis and the class character of law; and (3) the withering
away of state and law in the communist society. Although these
doctrines have had varying degrees of influence on Soviet national
and international legal theory, an awareness of each one of them is
essential to understanding the sociology of Soviet law.
The sociological theories of law contrast sharply with the Marxian emphasis on history and evolving economic forces. Therefore,
as a comparison with the Marxist concept of law and as a basis for
discussing the heuristic and "parental" functions of Soviet law, Max
Weber's sociological concept of law will also be briefly outlined in
this section.
A.

The Economic Determinationof Law

Marx viewed law as an ideological superstructure erected above
an economic basis. He proposed the idea that
legal relations as well as forms of the State could be neither understood by themselves, nor explained by the so-called general
progress of the human mind, but they are rooted in the material
conditions of life.... With the change of the economic foundation the 25entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.
Engels made a similar statement regarding private law: -If the State
SOVIET CIVIL LAW: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THEIR BACKGROUND UNDER THE SOVIET

REGIME 163-66 (1948); H. KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW (1955); J.
PLAMENATZ, GERMAN MARXISM AND RUSSIAN COMMUNISM 74-87, 135-63 (1965);

R.

SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY:

ITS SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOP-

MENT 17-26 (1951); Dorbin, Soviet Jurisprudence and Socialism, 52 LAW Q. REV.
402 (1936); Gsovski, The Soviet Concept of Law, 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1948);
Hampsch, Marxist Jurisprudence, 35 NOTRE DAME LAw. 525 (1960); Stone, L'etat,

c'est -moi!L'dtat est mort! A Retrospect on Soviet Marxist Theorizing on State and Law,
10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 754 (1963). See also Kanet, The Rise and Fall of the "All-peoples
State": Recent Changes in the Soviet Theory of the State, 20 SOVIET STUDIES 81 (1968);
Krylenko, Toward a Marxist Conception of Law and State, in SOVIET POLITICAL
THOUGHT: AN ANTHOLOGY 142 (M. Jaworskyj ed. & transl. 1967); Pashukanis, Morality, Law, and Justice, in id. at 138; Stuchka, The Marxist Class Theory of Law, in id.
at 87.
25 Marx, Excerpt from A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in
BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 42, 43-44 (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
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and public law are determined by economic relations, so, too, of
course is private law, which indeed in essence only sanctions the
existing economic relations between individuals which are normal
in the given circumstances." 26 Carried to the extreme, since the

form and content of law are necessarily shaped by economic factors,
decisions by judges and jurists can be viewed as nothing more than
7
axiomatic reflexes to economic conditions.1
Engels admitted later in his life, however, that to a certain degree
he and Marx had overstated the importance of economic factors:
"The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the
superstructure [including lawi . . . also exercise their influence
upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form."2 Similarly, Bukharin, a Russian Marxist, conceded that "[t~he superstructure, growing out of
the economic conditions and the productive forces determining these
conditions, in its turn, exerts an influence on the latter, favoring or
2

6Engels,

Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German, Philosophy, in

BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 195, 235 (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
27
See K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 24, at 60.
28

.etter from Frederich Engels to Joseph Block, Sept. 21, 1890, in BASIC WRITINGS
In this letter Engels
also stated:
According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining
element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than
this neither Marx nor I has ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into
saying that the economic element is the only determining one he transforms
that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. Id.
Cf. Marx's statement in text accompanying note 32 infra.
Writing only a month later, in a letter to Conrad Schmidt dated October 27, 1890,
Engels seemed to admit an ideological function of law, which may even rise to the
heights of a motivating or self-actaalizingforce:
In a modem state law must not only correspond to the general economic
condition and be its expression, but must also be an internally coherent expression ....
And in order to achieve this the faithful reflection of economic
conditions suffers increasingly. All the more so the more rarely it happens
that a code of law is the blunt, unmitigated, unadulterated expression of the
domination of a class - this in itself would offend the "conception of right."
*
Thus to a great extent the course of the "development of right" consists
only, first, in the attempt to do away with the contradictions arising from the
direct translation of economic relations into legal principles, and to establish a harmonious system of law, and then in the repeated breaches made in
this system by the influence and compulsion of further economic development,
which involves it in further contradictions. ...
The reflection of economic
relations as legal principles ... goes on without the person who is acting being
conscious of it, the jurist imagines he is operating with a priori propositions,
whereas they are really only economic reflexes ....
And it seems to me obvious that this inversion, which, so long as it remains unrecognized, forms
what we call ideological outlook, reacts in its turn upon the economic basis
and may, within certain limits, modify it. Letter from Frederich Engels to
ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 395, 397-98 (L. Fener ed. 1959).

Conrad Schmidt, Oct. 27, 1890, in BASIC WRIINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY, supra at 404.
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retarding their growth." 29 Reservations such as this, however, were
not meant to detract from the ultimate impact of economic factors
upon the development of legal and social systems. One commentator has stated: "Though it is conceded that the prevailing system of
economic production is not the exclusive cause in the development
of history and law, still it is held [by most Marxists] that the economic system is in the last instance the determining and by far the
most important factor of historical and legal evolution."3 °
Marxian Class Analysis and the Class Characterof Law

B.

Marxian social theory is based on the premise that the primary
function of social organization is the satisfaction of the basic human
needs for food, clothing, and shelter." The material production
system is therefore the essential element around which all other societal institutions are organized:
In the social production which men carry on, they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will;
these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total
of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure
of society - the real foundation, on which rise legal and political
superstructures32 and to which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness.
Marxian theory asserts that in the course of providing for basic
material human needs and through the utilization of the instruments
of production, the members of any precommunist society become
segregated into classes. "The mode of production in material life,"
stated Marx, "'determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of
men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social
existence determines their consciousness." 3 In another context Marx
stated: "As individuals express their life, so they are. What
they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what
they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals
thus depends on the material conditions determining their production." 4
29

N. BUKHARIN, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 228 (1925).
0 E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 4, at 80.
31
See, e.g., K. MARx & F. ENGELS, supra note 24, at 7.
3

32 Marx, supra note 25, at 43. See also Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,
in BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 68, 88-89 (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
33
Marx, supra note 25, at 43.
3
4 K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 24, at 7.
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A Marxist definition of class can be stated as any aggregate of
persons that perform the same function in the production scheme.
Marx based his class differentiation on objective factors such as the
ownership or nonownership of the instruments of production. He
outlined three main classes, differentiated according to their relation to the means of production in the socioeconomic system: (1)
The capitalists are the owners of the means of production, and "[b]y
'bourgeoisie' is meant the class of modern capitalists [who are the]
owners of the means of social production and employers of wage
labor." ' 5 (2) The workers or proletarians are all those employed
in the industrial system by others. The proletariat, therefore, is that
"class of modern wage laborers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor power in order
to live.""8 (3) The landowners in Marx's theory differ from capitalists and are regarded as survivors of feudalism or serfdom. It is
clear from The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,7 which is an
application of Marxian class analysis to a specific historical event,
that Marx recognized differentiation and substrata within each of the
basic class categories. For example, he perceived the petty bourgeoisie or small businessmen as a transitional class wherein the interests of two classes are combined. 8 According to Marx, the economic tendencies inherent in the capitalist system will eventually
cause the petty bourgeoisie to bifurcate, some descending to the working class and some improving their economic circumstances to become
significant capitalists.
Marx's primary interest was in understanding and facilitating
the emergence of class consciousness among the exploited strata of
society. Under Marxian theory economic and social position determine all consciousness, but class consciousness results specifically
from the inherent conflict of interests and overt struggle between the
classes. Since interclass antagonism is the means by which a particular social group reaches an organized self-identification, it is
possible to have a social stratum within a society that has a number
of objective economic characteristics in common and yet, due to the
lack of antagonism, has not attained that level of "consciousness"
or social awareness necessary to make the group a social and political
35 Marx & Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in

BAsIc WiTNGs ON

POLITCS AND PHILOSOPHY 1, 6-7 n.1 (L. Feuer ed. 1959).

3old.

37K.

MARX, THE 18ITH BRuMAE oF Louis BONAPARTE (Int'l Publishers ed.

1968).
38
Marx & Engels, supra note 35, at 34.
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force. 9 Class consciousness may be defined, therefore, as the social
awareness of the members of a particular group, who are fulfilling
the same economic function within the society, of their common
relationship and interests to one another and their antagonism toward the other classes of the socioeconomic system.
Under normal conditions, the ruling class can prevent the emergence of "true" class consciousness by imposing social control
through the use of propaganda and police power, often under the
guise of legality.40 Thus, Marx did not view nation-states as incarnations of justice or emanations of metaphysical entities in terms
of the spirit of man or world-view; rather, they were institutions of
economic life - tools for the economically powerful to maintain
and strengthen their power positions. 41
3
9 An example of such a group was the French small-holding peasants described by
Marx in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. These peasants possessed many attributes which might imply a common class situation:
The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live
in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one
another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead
of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by
France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants.
Their field of production, the small holding, admits of no division of labour
in its cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major
part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society.... In so far as millions
of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their
mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes,
and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as
there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants,
and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and
no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are
consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name,
whether through a parliament or through a convention. K. MARX, stpranote
37, at 123-24.
40 The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has
control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental
production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the
ideal expression of the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas;
hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 24, at 39.
41 Marx wrote:
Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the
State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society; but it is
nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeois necessarily
adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of
their property and interests. Id. at 59.
It can be argued that Marx and Engels' description of the modern state as an "executive committee" for managing the common affairs of the entire ruling bourgeois class
was a defendable viewpoint since at that time free general elections were not yet com-
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The attitudes of the lower class during the predominance of the
economically powerful can be characterized by the Marxian term
false consciousness. Marx explained: "Just as our opinion of an
individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not
judge such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on
the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained from the
contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between
social forces of production." 4-2 Under relatively normal conditions
of oppression, Marx found little correlation between the objective
class position and the subjective class consciousness. "And as in private life one differentiates between what a man thinks and says of
himself and what he really is and does, so in historical struggles one
must distinguish still more the phrases and fancies of parties from
their real organism and their real interests, their conception of themselves, from their reality. ' 43 "True" class consciousness emerges only
through class struggle and does not achieve totality until the social
system reaches a point of breakdown and social revolution occurs.
Marxian class analysis and social theory explain the history of
mankind following the rise of class divisions in terms of class struggles:
At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of
production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing
- with the property relations within which they have been at work
before. From forms of development of the forces of production
H. LAsKI, THE STATE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1935); A. MEYER, MARXISM: THE UNITY OF THEORY AND PRACTICE (1954). But as Professor Carl J. Friedrich

mon. See

has noted, "it is necessary to understand this formulation also as a vivid expression of
Marx's opposition to Hegel: it is the sharpest rejection of the ethical nature of the state,
which Hegel has asserted." C. FRiEDEICH, supra note 24, at 145. See also F. ENGELS,
THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIvATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE 193-94, 196 (Int'l
Publishers ed. 1942).
42
Marx, supra note 25, at 44. For a comprehensive discussion of the Marxian concept of "false consciousness," see G. LUKkcs, GEsCHIcHTE uND KLASSENBEWUSSTSEJN
(1923); G. LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS (MIT Press ed. 1970).
43 K_ MARx, supra note 37, at 47. Marx and Engels made the following observations
concerning the development of consciousness:
We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process
we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this
life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily,
sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and
bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of
ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain
the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development, but
men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter,
along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their
thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.
K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 24, at 14-15.
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these relations turn
into their fetters. Then comes the period of
44
social revolution.
The era of bourgeois capitalism in the 19th century was not
without its class struggles. Marx stated:
The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of
feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has
but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new
forms of struggle in place of the old ones.
Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however,
this distinctive feature: It has simplified the class antagonisms.
Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great
hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other 45
bourgeoisie and proletariat.
In the bourgeois capitalistic system, the working class is exploited
by the owners of the instruments of production who are the visible

common oppressors. This oppression forges a unity of interests with44 Marx, supra note 25, at 44.

45

Marx and Engels, supra note 35, at 8. Engels explained the causes for class
struggle within the bourgeois capitalistic system as follows:
[Under the capitalist system) the owner of the instruments of labor always
appropriated to himself the product, although it was no longer his product,
but exclusively the product of the labor of others. Thus the products now produced socially were not appropriated by those who had actually set in motion
the means of production and actually produced the commodities, but by the
capitalists. The means of production, and production itself, had become in
essence socialized. But they were subjected to a form of appropriation which
presupposes the private production of individuals ....
This contradiction, which gives to the new mode of production its capitalistic character, contains the germ of the whole of the social antagonisms of
today. The greater the mastery obtained by the new mode of production...
the more it reduced individual production to an insignificant residuum, the
more clearly was brought out the incompatibility of socialized production with
capitalistic appropriation....
The contradiction between socialized production and capitalistic appropriation manifested itself as the antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie.
Engels, supra note 32, at 94-95 (emphasis omitted).
Coterminous with the developing class struggle in bourgeois capitalist society was the
increasing alienation of man within his sociolegal system. Professor Fuller has noted
that Marx had a strong aversion for any principle or arrangement whereby one man
would necessarily serve the needs or ends of another:
This fundamental aversion to interdependence comes to most articulate expression in an early passage in which Marx describes life in bourgeois society
- that is, in a trading society - as one in which man "treats others as means,
reduces himself to the role of a means, and becomes the plaything of alien
forces." L. FULLER, supra note 5, at 26, citing R. TucKER, PHILOSOPHY AND
MYTH IN KARL MARX 105 (1961).
Professor Fuller also recommends Robert Tucker's book "to anyone who wants to acquire
a sense of what may be called the 'moral feel' of Marx's thought." Id. at 26 n.20.
See also R. TUCKER, THE SOVIET POLITICAL MIND: STUDIES IN STALINISM AND POSTSTALIN CHANGE (1963). For an analysis of the communist philosophy of morality, see
G. GuINs, SOVIET LAw AND SOVIET SOCIETY 24-35. (1954); C. McFADDEN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM, chs. VII & XV (1939); H. MARCUSE, MARXISM 215-31
(1961).
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in the working class and compels it to organize to meet the structured
conflict situation with its capitalist-employers over wages and working conditions.
To the Marxist, the bourgeois capitalistic system is the final stage
of class struggles; the social ferment and resulting social revolution
which will emerge from this system will rapidly transform the immense social and political superstructure and bring into existence
the classless communistic society. According to Marx:
[t]he bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form
of the social process of production - antagonistic not in the sense
of individual antagonism, but of one arising from conditions surrounding the life of individuals in society; at the same time the
production forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society
create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism.
This social formation constitutes, therefore,
the dosing chapter of
46
the prehistoric stage of human society.

The Marxian concept of law is based upon the class analysis
which has been briefly outlined above. In Marxian theory, law is
viewed as an emanation of the "state" and is therefore fundamentally determined by economic relationships. To quote Engels:
Since the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling
class assert their common interests, and in which the whole civil
society of an epoch is epitomized, it follows that in the formation
of all communal institutions the State acts as intermediary, that
these institutions receive a political form. Hence the illusion that
law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its
real basis -

on free will ....

It must not be forgotten that law

has just as little an independent history as religion. 47

Since the state is a product of the struggle of classes, dominated
by the ruling class, law is viewed as a political means for maintaining the economic interests of the ruling class. Law is an ideological
superstructure of society, constructed upon the economic basis, which
reflects the materialistic outlook of the ruling class.48 Law is not
46

Marx, supranote 25, at 44.
& F. ENGELs, supra note 24, at 60-61.

47 K. MARX
48

Whilst the State may attempt to create the illusion of "standing above class,"
Law (at least Civil Law) cannot do so; for it has to express, within its framework, the basic social relations themselves. Property relations, for example,
are mere legal expressions for existing relations of production, and social
classes may be described as owning (or not owning) certain kinds of property.
But legal and political forms of social consciousness must be distinguished
from the underlying economic basis. While dependent on the latter, they
have also an independent life of their own. Thus the relations of production
in one period may influence subsequent periods. Law can never be "higher"
than the particular economic structure of society and the resultant cultural
development But it certainly can be backward in relation to the actual stage of
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oriented to the idea of "justice;" rather it is a means of dominance
and a tool of the exploiters or ruling class who use it in their own
interests.
A Marxist evolutionary (but precommunist) societal-progression
can be constructed as follows: First, individuals group together for a
purpose relating to basic subsistence (food gathering, common shelter, mutual protection); second, the manner in which the individuals
within this "society" interact and cooper'ate4" in the use of the means
of production of subsistence commodities becomes established in the
form of rules and laws; third, once the laws are generally accepted or generally imposed, the leaders or "rulers" of the group
perpetuate the laws in order to maintain the stability of the society
and its ongoing function relative to their own dominant position
within the society as the "ruling class." In such a society law is an
institution, an expression of an economically related ideology which
effectuates and maintains the material status quo. Furthermore, the
society itself, by habit or avoidance of anarchy, compels its members
to obey the law.
This "institutional" aspect of law is evident in the Soviet legal
system. With regard to Soviet techniques of adjudication, Professor Berman has noted that Soviet judicial opinions reflect a syllogistic mode of reasoning, and a conceptual rather than a pragmatic
logic:
All flavor of "sociological jurisprudence" is missing from [Soviet
legal opinions]. Law seems to be conceived in terms of fixed
rules; its application is viewed as requiring accuracy, not policy.
The opinions are short. Occasionally the facts of the case are developed at length, but rarely is there any elaborate discussion of
the law. The opinion has more the form of a decree, and indeed
is entitled a "decree" (postanoylonis). Typically the court characterizes the facts in the language of those articles of the codes or
provisions of statutes which it considers to be relevant, and then
economic development. Unless the old forms can be used for changing social
purposes, or re-interpreted to serve new needs, they may prove serious obstacles for the development of society, and actual political struggle may be
needed to solve the contradiction. Thus it is certainly wrong to interpret
Marxism by stating that the "superstructures," amongst which is Law, reflect
economic conditions automatically. Law not only reacts upon economics, but
is also influenced by various forms of social consciousness even more remote
from economic life than Law itself - for example by religious and philosophical conceptions. In this interaction of the various forms of social life, economics are only dominant because men must eat before they can theorise, and
because the evolution of the production forces (i.e. of the relations between
Man and Nature which underlie the relations of production) forms that independent variable which makes possible a dynamic interpretation of society.

R.
49

SCHLESINGER, supra note 24, at 18-19.
See K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 24, at 7, 18.
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simply "applies" these artides or provisions. There is very little
argumentation. On the other hand, where it is conceived that
there is a gap in the law, the Soviet courts often do not hesitate
to fill it. In fact Soviet codes and statutes are full of lacunae, and
as a result much of Soviet law is avowedly judge-made.-5

Despite its overemphasis on economic determinants, Marxian
class analysis is a valuable analytical and interpreting tool for understanding history, current politics, and even legal processes. The
concept that classes are products of the relations of production and
commerce and are therefore purely economically conditioned is a
valuable insight, although only a partial truth. Undoubtedly, economic interests have had a great influence in history, including the
history of law.5 ' Furthermore, Marx's stress on the economic determination of political, social, and legal behavior indicates the
necessity today for a multivariate analysis in order to understand all
the integrative aspects of a dynamic sociolegal system.
C.

The Withering Away of State and Law in the
Communist Society

According to Marxian theory, after the "workers' social revolution," and even after the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship,
the class character of law will continue as long as the new ruling
proletariat needs the old order's legal institutions, coercive apparatus,
and "law" to suppress and eliminate the unenlightened hostile elements and groups within the new regime. Marx and Engels predicted, however, that all law would eventually disappear. As Professor Berman has noted:
Marx and Engels foresaw a classless society in which disputes
would be settled by the spontaneous, unofficial social pressure of
50
Berman, Law as an Instrument of Peace in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 943 (1970) (in original draft).
51
See C FRIEDRICH, AN INTRODUCTION To POLITICAL THEORY 156 (1967). See
also C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 24, at 149, 152. One commentator has noted:
Dynamic and conflict-oriented analyses of the legal order are indebted to Marxist theories. And a Marxist or Marxist-like emphasis on the broad structuring
of economic relations has provided the foundation for various specific studies
of legal trends, ranging from the area of property law to that of criminal law
and penology. E. SCHUR, supra note 4, at 114-15.
The most constructive contributions to understanding the relation between economic
conditions and legal institutions from a Marxist point of view have come from Karl
Renner and Otto Kirchheimer. See, e.g., K. RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRrVATE
LAw AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS (0. Kahn-Freund ed. & A. Schwarzchild transl.
1949); G. RuscHE & 0. KrRcrEmt, PUNIsHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
(1939). See also 0. KiRcHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS (1961). For a critique of Renner's analysis of property
in a capitalist society, see W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 368-72 (5th ed. 1967); R.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 24, at 27-29.
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the whole community, by the group sense of right and wrong or
at least expediency. They saw a precedent for this in the condition of certain primitive peoples who have no positive law, no
state, but instead punish aberrational behavior through informal,
spontaneous group sanctions. As among primitive societies at the
beginning of history, so in classless society at the end of history,
they said in effect, control will exist only in the habits and standards of the whole people, in the mores of the good society.52

Therefore, a third major doctrine of the Marxian philosophy of
law is the prophecy of the disappearance of law in the evolving communistic society. But according to classical Marxist theory, law and
the state as instruments of oppression and coercion will disappear
only after the complete victory of communism and the establishment
53
of a classless society.

The theoretical implications of the withering away of state and
law are important for an understanding of the heuristic and "parental" functions of law within the Soviet legal system. Classical
Marxist literature is not explicit on how man and his sociolegal institutions must be changed to make the communist society possible.
It is clear, however, that even after the state and law have withered,
there will be a continuing administration in the area of economic
production. Obviously, without overt enforcement by state compulsion, the maintenance of the stability of the social order required
by the continuing administration of material production would necessitate a fundamental change in the acquisitional and aggressive attitudes of the citizens of the precommunist society. Without some
external mechanism of enforcement and coercion, the social norms
required for stability of the economic administration must be "inter52
H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 280. As will be discussed below, informal, spontaneous group sanctions have become an integral part of the Soviet legal system.
53 One commentator has noted that it is this doctrine of the withering away of
the state and law which gives a certain metaphysical aspect to the Marxian interpretation
of law:
Marx was convinced that the world was traveling from lower to higher forms
of social life. He believed that communism, which he considered to be the
next stage in the evolution of mankind, would be a social system superior to
the capitalistic system that preceded it, and that a socialist or communist order
would be able to dispense with instruments of compulsion like law and the
state. He as well as Engels was convinced that, after the establishment of
communism, the inexorable, deterministic laws of development that had hitherto governed the history of mankind would cease to be controlling, and that
mankind would leap from the "realm of necessity into the realm of freedom."
The realization of material abundance, social justice, and full cultural bloom
would be the great accomplishments of the new social order. E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 4, at 81 (footnote omitted).
See also Hazard, The Withering Away of the State: The Function of Law, SURVEY: A
JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, No. 38, Oct. 1961, at 22; Kline,
The IWitheringAway of the State: Philosophy and Practice,id., at 63.
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nalized" so that compliance with the economic administration and
appropriate behavior within the social system itself will be voluntary, predictable, and subject to intragroup correction.
This aspect of classical Marxian theory has been discounted as
utopian,5 4 but for the present discussion we need not be concerned
with whether such a monumental social change is actually possible.
Rather our concern is in establishing the philosophical and theoretical groundwork upon which is based much of the Soviet justification
for using the legal system as an educational means in the preparation
of the citizenry for the true communist state.
Marx foresaw that the first step in the revolution of the working
class would be "'to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling
class, to establish democracy." 5 5 Marx died before he could complete his class analysis; however, he did make several references
concerning society's transition to communism. In his earliest discussion of the transition, in 1847, Marx predicted that in place of the
old capitalistic society, there would be substituted "an association
which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will no
longer be any political power ..... .In the Communist Manifesto,
published in 1848, Marx and Engels foresaw "a vast association of the
whole nation" in which "the public power will lose its political
character,"5 7 and a "conversion of the functions of the State into a
54

See, e.g., J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAw AND JUSTIcE, ch. 10 (1966).
See also H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 22-23; R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 24, at 26162; Kelsen, The Law as a Specific Social Technique, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 84, 84-85 (1941);
Shaffer, Communism and Facisrm:Two Peas in a Pod?, 69 QUEENS Q. 146, 154 (1962),
reprinted in THE SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 28, 35 (H. Shaffer ed. 1965).
55 K. MARX & F. ENGELS, Manifestoj of the Communist Party, in THE COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO 31 (S. Beer ed. 1955). Marx further stated in this context:
The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the
hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to
increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.
Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of
despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois
production, by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insuffident and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip
themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production.

Id.
6K MARX, Excerpt from Poverty of Philosophy, in SELECTED WRITINGS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 239 (T. Bottomore & M. Rubel eds. 1956). Marx and
5

Engels defined "political power" as "the organized power of one class for oppressing
another." K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 55, at 32. Marx claimed that this defini-

tion applied only to "bourgeois" states.

But perhaps it applies in an even greater

sense to communist states.
57
K. MARX & F. ENGELS, supra note 55, at 32.

from the following quotation:

The textual statement was taken
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mere superintendence of production." 8 In one of Marx's last works,
Critique of the Gotha Program,5 9 published in 1875, he expounded
a partial analysis of the transitional stages of the communist society
which has played a prominent part in Soviet political as well as
jurisprudential writing ever since Lenin made it central to his work,
State and Revolution.6° In his Critique, Marx stated that "with
the abolition of class distinctions all social and political inequality
arising from these would also disappear of itself."'"
Engels also spoke of the transition to communism. He wrote
that "the political state, and with it political authority, will dis-

appear as a result of the coming social revolution, that is, that public
functions will lose their political character and be transformed into
the simple administrative functions of watching over the true inter'
ests of society." 62
Engels later referred to "'the future conversion of
political rule over men into an administration of things and a direction of processes of production - that is to say, the 'abolition of
the state.' "63 According to Engels, the state will "wither away."
In the sentences which precede this statement the entire Marxist legal
and political philosophy is well expressed:
While the capitalist mode of production more and more completely transforms the great majority of the population into proletarians, it creates the power which, under penalty of its own destruction, is forced to accomplish this revolution. While it forces
on more and more the transformation of the vast means of production, already socialized, into state property, it shows itself the way
to accomplishing this revolution. The proletariat seizes political
power and turns the means of production into state property.
But in doing this it abolishes itself as proletariat, abolishes all
class distinctions and class antagonisms, abolishes also the state as
state. Society thus far, based upon class antagonisms, has had need
of the state. That is, of an organization of the particular class
which was pro tempere the exploiting class, an organization for the
When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared,
and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association
of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character....
In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is
the condition for the free development of all. Id.
58 Id. at 43.
59

See Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND
PHILOSOPHY 112 (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
60
See V. LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION 75-85 (Int'l Publishers ed. 1968),

discussed in text accompanying notes 65-72 infra.
61 Marx, supra note 59, at 125.
62

Engels, On Authority, in BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 481,

485 (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
63 Engels, supra note 32, at 86.
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purpose of preventing any interference from without with the
existing conditions of production, and, therefore, especially for
the purpose of forcibly keeping the exploited classes in the condition of oppression corresponding with the given mode of production (slavery, serfdom, wage labor). The state was the official
representative of society as a whole; the gathering of it together
into a visible embodiment. But it was this only in so far as it was
the state of that class which itself represented, for the time being,
society as a whole: in ancient times, the state of slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, the feudal lords; in our time, the bourgeoisie. When at last it becomes the real representative of the
whole of society it renders itself unnecessary. As soon as there
is no longer any social class to be held in subjection, as soon as
class rule and the individual struggle for existence based upon our
present anarchy in production, with the collisions and excesses arising from these, are removed, nothing more remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary. The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes
itself the representative of the whole of society - the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society - this
is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state. State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another,
superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons
is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of
processes of production. The state is not "abolished." It dies
64
Of't.

It was Lenin, however, writing in 1917, who intially formulated
a full exposition of a theory of the transitional period of proletarian
dictatorship. 65 In his work State and Revolution, Lenin wrote:

"The state is the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where, and to the
extent that the class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled.
And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable." 66 Lenin postulated that the new state,
which is "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word,"67 would
64 Id. at 105-06. The last sentence of this quotation is often translated as "It withers
away-.
05
Professor Berman has stated:
Lenin accepted the classical Marxist conception of state and law as instruments of coercion, but called for the use of a new proletarian state apparatus
to crush the bourgeoisie. He thus rejected the appeal of the anarcho-syndicalists for immediate abolition of all state apparatus. At the same time, the
theory of the "withering away" of the state, once the classless society had
emerged, was made central to Lenin's doctrine of socialism. H. BERMAN,
supra note 14, at 24-25.
See A. MEYER, supra note 41; R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 24, at 29-35. See also J.
HAZARD, THE SoviET SYsTEm oF GoVERNMENT 7-8, 149-50 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
66 V. LENIN, supra note 60, at 8.
67 V. LENIN, Tasks of the Proletariatin Our Revolution, in 2 ESSENTIALS OF

25, 34 (London ed. 1947), quoting Letter from Frederich Engels to Bebel,
March 18-28, 1875.
LENIN
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pass through two stages towards stabilization after the revolution
of the proletariat. The first stage would be socialism. In this stage
the state would be rebuilt using the old machinery of bourgeois institutions. "Marxism differs from anarchism in... that it recognizes
the necessity for the state and for state power in a period of revolution in general, and in the period of transition from capitalism to
Socialism in particular.""8 During this first phase of communistic development, that of socialism, the nation would be one
large workshop and office of controlled production, where each man's
pay would be equal to the amount of work he did. The second and
higher stage, that of "true" communism, was to occur after some
prosperity, when controls could be eased. There would be more
abundance; the effect of capitalists would be nil; and, therefore,
prices would not have to be high. In this second evolutionary phase
a man's pay would now be equal to his needs, and since theoretically this would alleviate all want, there would be no economic
depriviation and therefore no need for a police state with its bourgeois institutions of law and government. As Lenin wrote: "[Olnce
the majority of the people itself suppresses its oppressors, a 'special
force' for suppression is no longer necessary. In this sense the state
begins to wither away.''09 State officials would be reduced to carrying out the instructions of the armed workers, much in the manner
of "responsible, moderately paid 'managers,'" and the beginning of
the revolution on this basis
of itself leads to the gradual "withering away" of all bureaucracy,
to the gradual creation of a new order ... an order in which the

more and more simplified functions of control and accounting will
be performed by each in turn, will become habit, and will finally

die out
as special functions of a special stratum of the population. 70
Socialism would ultimately "shorten the working day, raise the
masses to a new level, [and] create such conditions for the majority
of the population as to enable everybody, without exception, to perform 'state functions,' and this [would] lead to a complete withering away of every state in general."'" Lenin based his analysis on
the manifestations of the withering away of state and law in the
68 Id.

69 V. LENIN, supra note 60, at 37.
70 Id. at 43. A comparison can be made here to Professor Fuller's functional distinction between "managerial direction" and "law" and also his discussion of the "juristic aspects of managerial systems." See L. FULLER, supra note 5, at 207-10, 212-13.
71 V. LENIN, supra note 60, at 98-99.
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Paris Commune of 1871 and in the early stages of the Bolsheviks'
regime in Russia. 2
After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Marxist interpretation of law was accepted by the Soviet Union as an official creed.
During the early years of the new regime, several Soviet jurists expounded the doctrine of the eventual withering away of the state
and law. In the decades following the Revolution, however, the
Marxist concept of law has undergone a number of substantial transformations, and there is no indication that the process of reinterpretation and readaption of the "classical" Marxist doctrines to the
ever-changing political situation within the Soviet Union has come
to a halt. No attempt is made herein to comprehensively trace this
complex development, although certain aspects of the Soviet applications of "classical" Marxism will be discussed in a later section of
this article.

7

1

The brief outline of the Marxist evolutionary concept of law
presented above provides a sufficient basis for counterdistinguishing
a more integrative and sociological concept of law, and also for
recognizing the theoretical implications of Marxist ideology and legal
theory which are found in the Soviet legal system as discussed below.
D. Max Weber's Sociological Concept of Law: A Comparison
Max Weber's sociological concept of law is a striking contrast
to Marxian legal theory and provides an interactional perspective
for analyzing the heuristic and "parental" functions of law within
the Soviet system. The following discussion of Weber's sociology
7

2 Concerning the Paris Commune of 1871, Lenin stated:

The Commune ceased to be a state in so far as it had to repress, not the majority of the population but a minority (the exploiters); it had broken the bourgeois state machinery; in the place of a special repressive force the whole
population itself came onto the scene. All this is a departure from the state
in its proper sense. And had the Commune asserted itself as a lasting power,
remnants of the state would of themselves have "withered away" within it;it
would not have been necessary to "abolish" its institutions; they would have
ceased to function in proportion as less and less was left for them to do. Id.
at 56.
Later in the same year (1917), Lenin reported that the Russian Revolution had already
established, "although in a weak and embryonic form, precisely this new type of 'state,'
which is not a state in the proper sense of the word." V. LENIN, supra note 67, at 47.
In the following year, Lenin said, "we really have an organization of power which dearly
indicates the transition to the complete abolition of any power, of any state. This will be
possible when every trace of exploitation has been abolished, that is, in socialist society."
V. LENIN, Report on the Activities of the Council of Peoples' Commissars,Jan. 11, 1918,
to the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants'Deputies, in 2 SELECrED WoRKs 594-95 (Moscow ed. 1960).
73 See text accompanying notes 95-108 infra.
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of law will be limited to his general criticism of the theory of the
economic determination of law, his sociological concept of law including his typology of rational and irrational forms of lawmaking
and lawfinding, and his views on the class nature of law, and the
democratic administration of society.
Weber followed Marxian theory only in viewing history as a
continuous class struggle. Weber criticized the economic determinism of Marxian theory, and in his interpretation of legal thought
he gave as much weight to human ideas and ideals as he did to
purely economic interests. In this regard Weber stated:
To be sure, economic influences have played their part, but only

to this extent: That certain rationalizations of economic behavior,
based upon such phenomena as a market economy or freedom of
contract, and the resulting awareness of underlying, and increasingly complex conflicts of interests to be resolved by legal machinery, have influenced the systematization of the law or have intensified the institutionalization of political society. 74
Weber summarized the relations between law and economic activity as follows:
(1) Law (in the sociological sense) guarantees by no means
only economic interests but rather the most diverse interests ranging from the most elementary one of protection of personal security to such purely ideal goods as personal honor or the honor of
the divine powers. Above all, it guarantees political, ecclesiastical,
familial, and other positions of authority as well as positions of social preeminence of any kind which may indeed be economically
conditioned or economically relevant in the most diverse ways, but

which are neither economic in themselves nor sought for preponderantly economic ends.
(2)
Under certain conditions a "legal order" can remain unchanged while economic relations are undergoing a radical transformation. In theory, a socialist system of production could be
brought about without the change of even a single paragraph of
our laws, simply by the gradual, free contractual acquisition of all
the means of production by the political authority. . . . [T]he
legal order would still be bound to apply its coercive machinery in
case its aid were invoked for the enforcement of those obligations

74 M. WEBER, supra note 8, at 61. For other English translations of Weber's sociological theories, see FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H. Gerth & C. Mills
transls. & eds. 1958); MAX WEBER: THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGAN-

IZATION (T. Parsons ed., A. Henderson & T. Parsons transls. 1964); M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (G. Roth & C. Wittich
eds. 1968). See generally R. ARON, 2 MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT,
DURKHEIM, PARETO, WEBER (1967); R. BENDIX, MAX WEBER: AN INTELLECTUAL
PORTRAIT (1960); K. LOEWENSTEIN, MAX WEBER (1967); T. PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL AcrION 500-694 (3rd ed. 1968).
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on private
which are characteristic of a productive system based
75
property. Only, this case would never occur in fact.
(3) The legal status of a matter may be basically different
according to the point of view of the legal system from which it
is considered. But such differences [of legal classification] need
not have any relevant economic consequences provided only that on
those points which generally are relevant economically, the practical
effects are the same for the interested parties....
(4) Obviously, any legal guaranty is directly at the service
of economic interests to a very large extent. Even where this does
not seem to be, or actually is not, the case, economic interests are
among the strongest factors influencing the creation of law. For,
any authority guaranteeing a legal order depends, in some way,
upon the consensual action of the constitutive social groups, and
the formation of social groups depends, to a large extent, upon
constellations of material interests.
(5) Only a limited measure of success can be attained
through the threat of coercion supporting the legal order. Owing
to a number of external circumstances as well as to its own peculiar
nature, this applies especially to the economic sphere. It would be
quibbling, however, to assert that law cannot "enforce" any particuar economic conduct, on the ground that we would have to say,
with regard to all its means of coercion, that coactus tamen vohit
[although coerced, it was still his will]. For this is true, without
exception, of all coercion which does not treat the person to be coerced simply as an inanimate object. Even the most drastic means
of coercion and punishment are bound to fail where the subjects remain recalcitrant. In a broad mass such a situation would always
mean that its members have not been educated to acquiescence. Such
education to acquiescence in the law of the time and place has, as a
general rule, increased with growing pacification. Thus it should
seem that the chances of enforcing economic conduct would have increased, too. Yet, the power of law over economic conduct has in
weaker rather than stronger as compared with
many respects grown
76
earlier conditions.
Weber did not view the influence of economic determinants as
simply a function of the general level of acquiescence towards legal
coercion. Instead, he believed that this influence is determined by
the limitations of the economic capacity of the persons affected and
also by the relative proportion of strength of private economic in-

75 Subsequent history has proved Weber's conclusion to be only partially correct.
Professor Max Rheinstein has stated:
The norms of the legal order, existing before the total socialization took place
could also be applied after its occurrence, if legal title to the various means of
production were to be ascribed not to one single, central public authority but
to formally autonomous public institutions or corporations which are to regu-

late their relationships to each other by contractual transactions, subject to the
directions of, and control by, the central planning authority. Such a situation
does indeed exist in the Soviet Union. M. WEBER, supra note 8, at 36 n.24.

76 Id. at

35-37 (footnotes omitted).
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terests on the one hand and interests promoting conformance to the
rules of law on the other.
Weber theorized that some types of economic activity could be
carried on without formal state institutions. In contrast to Marx,
however, Weber believed that "an economic system, especially of the
modern type, could certainly not exist without a legal order with
very special features which could not develop except in the frame of
a 'statal' legal order. ' 77 The Soviet experience, with its modification of the "classical" Marxian theory and its retention of a coercive
legal system, partially verifies this aspect of Weber's analysis.
Weber retained Hegel's concept of the reciprocity of society and
the state in emphasizing the need in modern society for both the
ruled and the rulers to believe in the legitimacy of the sociolegal
system. Social stability is achieved through the social cohesion
brought about by cultural norms and the coalescence of material and
ideal interests, combined with the exercise of governmental authority
or status group dominion. Legitimate authority depends upon an
established administrative organization subject to specific controls and
acting pursuant to certain imperative guidelines. Weber recognized the complexity of the modern sociopolitical system, but rather
than postulating a cause and effect relationship or searching for a
primal cause - such as the Marxist's economic determinism - he
developed a cogent behavioral foundation for the institutional concepts of society, government, and the attendant legal system.
Weber defined law as "simply an 'order system' endowed with
certain specific guarantees of the probability of its empirical valid'
ity." 78
The probability that human conduct will be oriented toward
the idea of the existence of the order system determines its validity.7"
The distinctively legal emerges when "there exists a 'coercive apparatus,' i.e., that there are one or more persons whose special task
77 Id. at 39.
78 Id. at 13. Weber's approach in defining "law" and the "concept of law" is that of
a conceptual pragmatist. See notes 15-16 supra & accompanying text. For each term
he used, Weber posited a careful groundwork definition which was not meant to be a
statement of any "true" or "false" nature or essence of the term or the idea conveyed by
the term, but rather an explanation of what Weber meant when he chose to use the
term.
79 M. WEBER, supra note 8, at 3.
Only then will the content of a social relationship be called a social order
if the conduct is, approximately and on the average, oriented toward determinable "maxims." Only then will an order be called "valid" if the orientation
toward those maxims occurs, among other reasons, also because it is in some
appreciable way regarded by the actor as in some way obligatory or exemplary
for him. Id.
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it is to hold themselves ready to apply specially provided means of
coercion (legal coercion) for the purpose of norm enforcement." 0
A legal norm, therefore, exists in the probability that it will be
enforced by a specialized staff, and "[a] legal order can indeed be
characterized by the agreements which it does or does not enforce.' s1
Weber emphasized the role of coercion, but he did not limit the
notion to legally sanctioned physical force:
The means of coercion may be physical or psychological, they may
be direct or indirect in their operation, and they may be directed,
as the case may require, against the participants in the consensual
community, the consociation, the corporate body or the institution
within which the order system
is (empirically) valid; or they may
be aimed at those outside.82
In order to "legitimately" exercise such coercive force, the fully matured political community has developed a system of casuistic rules.
"'This system of rules constitutes the 'legal order,' and the political
community is regarded as its sole normal creator, since that community has, in modern times, normally usurped the monopoly of the
83
power to compel by physical coercion respect for those rules.
A central aspect of Weber's analysis of the concept of law is his
distinction between rational and irrational lawmaking and lawfinding.
Today we understand by lawmaking the establishment of general
norms which in the lawyers' thought assume the character of rational rules of law. Lawfinding, as we understand it, is the "application" of such established norms and the legal propositions deduced therefrom by legal thinking, to concrete "facts" which are
"subsumed" under these norms. 84

Weber emphasized two categories of lawmaking and lawfinding
rational and irrational. Lawmaking and lawfinding can proceed rationally or irrationally with respect to either formal or substantive
criteria. According to the typology which Weber developed for
distinguishing the various types of legal thought as they have appeared in the evolving processes of lawmaking and lawfinding,
s0 Id. at 13.
81 Id. at 100.
82 Id.at 13.
831d. at 341. In this analysis Weber viewed fully developed or matured law as a
system of governance by rules; he saw the distinctively legal obligation as a component
of an impersonal order that exhibits a strain toward rationality. However, when Weber
actually applied his concept of law, especially in his theory of bureaucracy, the significance of legal coercion was greatly modified.
84 Id.at 59.
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juristic development can approximate or consist of combinations of
the following types:8 5
1. Irrational,that is, not guided by general rules:
a. Formally irrational, that is, guided by means which are beyond the control of reason, such as an oracle, a prophetic revelation, or an ordeal.
b. Substantively irrational,that is, guided by reactions to or evaluations of each individual case. Although this type has no exact
counterpart in reality, it would seem to be representative of the ideal
of the free-law (Freirecht) movement in Germany, the jurisprudence
of interests as expounded in France at the turn of the century, and
the American schools of legal realism and sociological jurisprudence.
2. Rational, that is, guided by general principles:
a. Substantively rational, that is, guided by clearly conceived and
articulated general principles of an ideological system other than
that of the law itself, such as ethics, ideology, power politics, and
religion. Examples of this type are Mohammedan law and, in
certain respects, Soviet-Marxist law and legal theory.
b. Formally rational, that is, guided by operative facts which are
determined not from case to case but in a general manner. There
are two kinds of formal rationality:
(i) Extrinsically formal rationality, that is, ascribing significance to tangible facts common to every case; and
(ii) Logical formal rationality, that is, expressing its rules
by the use of abstract concepts created by legal thought itself
and conceived of as constituting a complete system. Examples
of this type are those methods of legal thought which in modern jurisprudence have become known as "jurisprudence of
concepts" or "conceptual jurisprudence."
Soviet-Marxist law and legal theory, viewed in terms of its
ideological basis, can be classified within this typology under the
heading of substantively rational. As an idealized type of lawmaking and lawfinding, the substantively rational
means that the decision of legal problems is influenced by norms
different from those obtained through logical generalization of abstract interpretations of meaning. The norms to which substantive
rationality accords predominance include ethical imperatives, utilitarian and other expediential rules, and political maxims, all of
which diverge from the formalism of the "external characteristics"
variety as well as from that which uses logical abstraction. 86
Indeed, it can be argued that it is due to this substantive rationality
that the Soviet legal system has placed an overt emphasis on the heuristic and "parental" functions of law, at least in the unidirectional
sense. Theoretically, the socialist system of law will "wither away,"
85

This schematic outline of Weber's typology has been modified from the discussion
presented in id. at 61-64, and in Rheinstein, Introduction to id. at xlii.
86
M. WEBER, supra note 8, at 64.
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but until that self-actualized stage of "true" communism is attained,
the coercive legal system is to be used as a means to internalize the
tenets of communist social behavior and public self-government.
In contrast to the Marxian theory of legal development, Weber
expounded a sociological explanation (and interactional analysis)
for legal and systemic societal change. In this regard Weber stated:
Theoretically, the origin of legal norms might, as we have already
seen, be thought of most simply in the following way: The psychological "set" which arises with the habituation of an action causes
conduct which in the beginning constitutes plain habit later to be
experienced as binding; then, with the awareness of the diffusion
of such conduct among a plurality of individuals, it comes to be
incorporated as "consensus" into people's semi- or wholly conscious
"expectations" as to the meaningfully corresponding conduct of
others. Finally these "consensual understandings" acquire the
guaranty of coercive enforcement by which they are distinguished
from mere "conventions." Even on this purely hypothetical construction there arises the question of how anything could ever
change in this inert mass of canonized custom which, just because
it is considered as binding, seems as though it could never give
birth to anything new.... Of course, empirically valid rules of
conduct, including legal rules, have at all times emerged, and still
emerge today, unconsciously, i.e., without being regarded by the
participants as newly created. Such unconscious emergence has occurred primarily in the form of unperceived changes in meaning;
it also takes place through the belief that a factually new situation
actually presents no new elements of any relevance for legal evaluation. Another form of "unconscious" emergence is represented
by the application of what actually is new law to old or somewhat
different new situations with the conviction that the law so applied
has always obtained and has always been applied in that manner.
Nonetheless, there also exists a large class of cases in which both
are felt to be "new," althe situation as well as the rule applied
though in different degrees and senses.87
Weber examined the sources of innovation in law from an interactional perspective and noted that where private elements are strong
in the legal system, the "auxiliary" jurists, such as lawyers, notaries,
conveyancers, and other draftsmen, assume special importance in that
system. When the state assures the bindingness of private agreements
and "special law,"'88 the drafters of these legal documents and the

871d. at 67-68.
88 This modern technique of leaving it to the interested parties thus to create
law not only for themselves but also with operative effects as regards third
parties gives those interested parties the advantages of a legal institution of
special law, provided they comply with the substantive requirements as expressed in those terms which they have to incorporate in their arrangement.
Id. at 141.
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creators of these new "social relationships" may become legal innovators who play an important role in shaping the legal and social development of the society. To a certain extent, such a legal development has occurred in the Soviet Union as the creative roles of the
lawyer and law worker have gained governmental approval and en89
couragement.
For Weber, as for Marx, "class" distinctions in modern society
result from unequal economic power. Economic determinants, however, are not the sole elements of status-group formation in Weber's
sociolegal analysis. Weber attempted to formulate a concept which
would encompass the influence of individuals and ideas upon the
formation of groups without losing sight of the economic conditions:
In contrast to the purely economically determined "class situation"
we wish to designate as "status situation" every typical component
of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or
negative, social estimation of honor.... In content, status honor
is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style
of life can be expected from all those who wish to belong to the
circle. 90

Weber defined democratic administration as administration based
upon the assumption that everyone is equally qualified to conduct
the public affairs and in which the scope of the power to command
is kept at a minimum." This definition would seem consonant with
the avowed goals of Marxism; however, Weber further noted:
Democracy becomes alienated from its purity where the group
grows beyond a certain size or where the administrative function
becomes too difficult to be satisfactorily taken care of by anyone
whom rotation, the lot, or election may happen to designate....
The growing complexity of the administrative tasks and the
sheer expansion of their scope increasingly result in the technical
superiority of those who have had training and experience and
will thus inevitably favor the continuity of at least some of the
functionaries. There always thus exists the probability of the rise
of a special, perennial structure for administrative purposes, which
92
of necessity, means for the exercise of domination.
This aspect of Weber's analysis is supported by the Soviet-Marxist attempt to create a "pure" democracy, which has resulted in the
80 See Barry, The Specialist in Soviet Policy-Making: The Adoption of a Law, 16
SOVIET STUDIES 152 (1965); Barry & Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 HARv.

L. REV. 1 (1968).
90

FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note

91 M. WEBER, supra note 8, at 330.
92Id. at 333-34.

74, at 186-87.
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creation of a "new ruling class" and an autocratic regime in which
law is essentially a means whereby the political leadership exercises control over society - contrary to most Western systems where
law is essentially a means for society to control the political leadership. 93
Weber's sociological and interactional perspective provides a
sharp contrast to "classical" Marxian theory and a point of departure
for analyzing the heuristic and "parental" functions of law within the
Soviet system.
IV.

THE HEURISTIC AND "PARENTAL"

FUNCTIONS OF LAW WITHIN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

To put a man behind walls and not to try to change him is to
deny him his humanity - and ours.04
Chief Justice Warren Burger,
Feb.

21, 1970.

The heuristic function of law is that aspect of the sociolegal
system by which individual or collective opinions concerning sociolegal relationships are created or stimulated in the interaction that
takes place within the social system between "the law" and "social
behavior." The educational and "parental" functions of law describe the role of law as a guiding teacher and parent. These functions can be viewed as unidirectional, that is, in terms of the "law"
directing desired social behavior; or they can be viewed as interactional, that is, in terms of the synergistic interplay between the social
participant (individual or collective) and the observed (or empirical) legal system. The "content" of the law within the particular
sociolegal system may also depend, to varying degrees, upon related
ideological, cultural, and traditional preconceptions, as well as
ethnocentricity, national outlook, and geographic position.
The Soviet system is an appropriate subject for an analysis of
the effect that an ideology can have on a legal system because the Soviet government accepted from the outset the clearly articulated ideological and political philosophy of "classical" Marxism, induding the
Marxian concept of law.9 5 In the decades following the Bolshevik
03 See Berman, supra note 50, at 948. See generally M. DJILAs, THE IMPERFECr
SOCIETY (1970); M. DJILAS, THE NEW CLASS (1957); N. Popovic, YUGOSLAVIA:
THE NEW CLASS CRISIS (1968).
94
N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1970 § E (Magazine), at 25.
95
See text accompanying notes 25-73 supra. See also Bell, Ten Theories in Search
of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior, 10 WORLD PoLITIcS 327 (1958);
Chambre, Soviet Ideology, 18 SOvIET STUDIES 14 (1967); Daniels, The Ideological
Vector, 18 SOVIET STUDIES 71 (1966); Fleron & Kelly, Personality, Behavior and Corn-
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Revolution of 1917, Soviet jurists have reinterpreted the Marxian
concept of law to justify the continuance of law and the maintenance
of a socially coercive legal system in a society where the state and
law are destined to "wither away." These jurists have viewed the
Soviet Union as being in a transitional period during which the sociolegal institutions are used to educate and direct the people in behavior patterns appropriate for the future stage of "true" communism.
Marxist-Soviet theorists have generally acknowledged two characteristics of the Soviet society's transition to communism: The state
with its law is to wither away, and at the same time increasing technical administration is to occur, without state compulsion, especially
in the realm of economic production. The implication of these two
propositions, without an alternative mechanism of coercion or enforcement, is that the "new Soviet man" - Homo Sovieticus must somehow be educated and trained to voluntarily observe the
norms required for the continuing administration and for the forthcoming stage of public self-government.
Lenin expanded Marx and Engels' theory of the withering away
of the state to include a full exposition of the transitional period of
"proletarian dictatorship." Lenin rejected the idea of immediately
abolishing the coercive state apparatus after the successful Revolution, but he retained the doctrine that the state and law would wither
away once the hostile elements in the socialist society had been
purged and the classless society had emerged. Furthermore, he emphasized the role of the "armed masses" of the people in maintaining order and administration without state compulsion. 6 Lenin's
emphasis on the role to be played by the masses during the transitional period suggests direct, informal, spontaneous, and collective
intragroup action without excess state compulsion. Thus, in his address, "To the Population," on November 5, 1917, Lenin stated:
Comrade toilers: Remember that now you yourselves are at the

helm of the state. No one will help you if you yourselves do not
unite and take in your hands all affairs of the state. . . . Get on
munist Ideology, 21 SOVIET STUDIES 297 (1970); Joravsky, Soviet Ideology, 18 SOVIET
STUDIES 2 (1966); Meyer, The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet PoliticalSystem: A

Speculative Essay Designed to ProvoheDiscussion, 17 SOVIET STUDIES 273 (1966); Red-

daway, Aspects of IdeologicalBelief in the Soviet Union: Comments on Professor Meyer's

Essay, 17 SOVIET STUDIES 473 (1966); Wesson, Soviet Ideology: The Necessity of Marx-

ism, 21 SOVIET STUDIES 64 (1969); Wesson, The Soviet State, Ideology and Patterns of
Autocracy, 20 SOVIET STUDIES 179 (1968).
9
6 V. LENIN, supra note 60, at 75.
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with the9 7job yourselves; begin right at the bottom, do not wait for
anyone.
Lenin also emphasized that the soviets were a "new state apparatus"
like that of the Paris Commune, "not a state in the proper sense of
the term," but a "transition state," a "harbinger of the withering
away of the state in every form," "the first step towards socialism,"
and "the first stage of a socialist society."9
In the early years of the new regime, the leading Soviet jurists
maintained a relatively strict interpretation of Marxian legal theory. 9 Thus, M. A. Reisner, writing in Moscow in 1925, anticipated
that "law, manifestly, will die out forever - side by side with a
whole series of other forms of ideological thinking."1 -" Reisner
treated law as a particular type of state action that would necessarily
wither away under communism due to the fulfillment ("each according to his needs") of all material individual needs. Another prominent Soviet jurist of the early years, Yevgenii B. Pashukanis,

equated the dying out of the "state" with "the dying out of law in
general" and "the gradual disappearance of the juridic elements in
human relations." 1'01
In the decades following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Marxist
concept of law has undergone numerous transformations and reinterpretations. 0 2 But Professor Berman has noted:
97V. LENIN, To the Population, Pravda, Nov. 7, 1917, in 2 SELECTED WORKS 530
ed. 1960).
(Moscow
98

See, e.g., V. LENIN, Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?, in 2 SELECTED
WORKS 435 (Moscow ed. 1960); V. LENIN, First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies: Speech on the Attitude Towards the Provisional Government, in 2 SELECTED WORKS 177 (Moscow ed. 1960); V. LENIN, Seventh AllRussian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., in 2 SELECTED WORKS 106 (Moscow ed. 1960);
V. LENIN, The Tasks of the Proletariatin Our Revolution, in 2 SELECTED WORKS 81
(Moscow ed. 1960). Concerning the Paris Commune, see note 72 supra & accompanying text.
99 See, e.g., Stuchka, The Revolution'ary Part Played by Law and State - A General
Doctrine of Law, in SoVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 17 (H. Babb transl. 1951).
10 0 Reisner, Law, Our Law, GeneralLaw, in SoVIET LEGAL PHILOsOPHy 83, 108-09
(H. Babb transl. 1951).
10 1 Pashukanis, The GeneralTheory of Law and Marxism, in SoviET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 111, 124 (H. Babb transl. 1951). In dealing explicitly with the doctrine of
the withering away of the state coupled with the pragmatic concept of the continuing
administration of society, Pashukanis attempted to distinguish between legal regulations,
which would gradually "die oat," and technical regulations, which would actually increase
in the new Soviet state. Id. at 135-36, 178. According to Pashukanis, a railroad timetable is an example of a purely technical regulation. As a legally imposed rule, the
timetable is a means for attaining maximum economic efficiency. A multiplicity of such
rules contributes to form a planned economy. In contrast, a law expressing railroad
liability is a purely juridic regulation. Similarly, a table of military organization is an
administrative-technical regulation, while a bourgeois draft law is a form of juridic
regulation. So long as the market economy continues, juridic regulations are necessary.
102 No attempt will be made here to trace this complex development which has been
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Whether conceived in terms of an immediate or of an ultimate
future, the idea that law will die out under Communism has had
important repercussions on the Soviet legal system from its initial
stages of development until the present. For connected with this
mystical concept is a practical distinction between official law and
unofficial law-consciousness, and a practical belief that the main
purpose of official law is to shape and develop that unofficial lawconsciousness, so that people will actually think and feel what the
state, through official law, prescribes. When the state has fully
educated all people to internalize 03the legal system, then that legal
system will no longer be needed.'
Persistently repeated throughout Marxist-Soviet writing is the
concept that legal institutions are to be used to educate the new
Soviet man in preparation for communism. Thus, article 3 of the
Law Concerning the Judicial System of the U.S.S.R. and of the
Union and Autonomous Republics states:
The court by all its activity is educating U.S.S.R. citizens in a spirit
of devotion to their fatherland and to the cause of socialism in a spirit of unswerving precision in carrying out soviet laws, of
care for socialist property, of labor discipline, of an honorable attitude towards state and 04
social duty, and of respect for the rules
of socialist life together.'
Presumably, the goal of law is thus to educate the people during the
period of socialism so that the transition to communism can be speedily carried out and the Marxian utopia achieved.
adequately discussed by several indefatigable scholars in the field. See, e.g., H. BERMAN,
supra note 14, at 29-96; G. GUINS, SOVIET LAW AND SOCIETY 8-23, 47-68 (1954).
See also Bodenheimer, The Impasse of Soviet Legal Philosophy, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 51
(1952); Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinski, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (1949).
103 H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 282. Concerning "law-consciousness," the following discussion based on L. I. Petrazhitskii's analysis of the subject should be noted:
To understand a legal system it is necessary to distinguish between the official
law proclaimed by the state and the unofficial law which exists in the minds
of men and in the various groups to which they belong. Each of us has his
own conceptions of rights, duties, privileges, powers, immunities - his own
law-consciousness. - . . The official law of the state, with its authoritative
technical language and its professional practitioners, cannot do violence to
the unofficial law-consciousness of the people without creating serious tensions
in society. At the same time, official law is more than a reflection of popular
law-consciousness; it also shapes it, directly or indirectly. Id. at 279 citing
L. I. PETRAZHITSKII, THORIIA PRAVA I GOSUDARSTA V SVIASI S TEORIEI
NRAvsTVENNOSTI [THE THEORY OF LAW AND STATE IN CONNECTION WITH

THE THEORY OF CHARACTER] (St. Petersburg ed. 1909).
Concerning the theories of Petrazhitskii, see Babb, Petrazhitskii:Science of Legal Policy
and Theory of Law, 17 BOSTON U.L. REV. 793 (1937); Reisner, The Theory of Petrazhitskii: Marxism and Social Ideology, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 71 (H. Babb
transl. 1951).
104 Law Concerning the Judicial System of the U.S.S.R. and the Union and Autonomous Republics, art. 3 (1938), translated in Golunskii & Strogovich, The Theory of
State and Law, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 351, 381 (H. Babb transl. 1951).
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Numerous Soviet jurists and political theorists have discussed
the educational role of legal institutions. Writing in 1918, Lenin
described the way in which the bourgeois court was replaced by the
people's court in the Soviet Union: "We transformed the court
from an instrument of exploitation into an instrument of education
on the firm foundations of socialist society."' 1 5 In 1927 Pashukanis
stressed that the criminal law should be applied in the Soviet Union
as a pedagogic measure. 10 S. A. Golunskii and M. S. Strogovich
wrote in 1940: "It is perfectly manifest that the educative part
played by the soviet court, which decides questions of applying the
law and compelling observance of legal norms, strengthens the citizens' consciousness of their moral obligations with reference to the
state and to each other."'0°7 In an address on "The Educational Significance of The Soviet Court," delivered and printed in 1947, Ivan
T. Goliakov, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the

U.S.S.R., stated:
The most important function of the socialistic state is the fundamental remaking of the conscience of the people, of the toilers
of the new society. A component part of this activity is the reification of justice which, while punishing criminals, at the same
time influences the masses, promoting their education in the spirit
of socialistic labor discipline and the observance of the rules of
socialistic living. The success of such influencing is assured by the
fact that crime, in its essence, is not native to a society constructed
on new principles and free of contradictions and class antagonisms

which give rise to crime.' 0 8

Since the death of Stalin in 1953, increasing numbers of Soviet
jurists have expressed the view that legal institutions have an important educational role within Soviet society. 09 But more impor105V. LENIN, Report on the Activities of the Council of People's Commissars, Jan.
24, 1918, to the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, in 2 SELECTED WORKS 592 (Moscow ed. 1960). See also V. LENIN,
The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government, in 2 SELECrED WORKS 723 (Moscow
ed. 1960).
'06 Pashukanis, supra note 101, at 217-18.
107 Golunskii & Strogovich, supra note 104, at 381.
108 Lecture by I. T. Goliakov entitled Vospitatelvoe snachenie sovetskogo suda [The
Educational Significance of the Soviet Court], May 15, 1947, translatedin I. T. GoL.A-

Kov, THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET COURT 16 (R. Kramer transl. 1948).

109 See, e.g., authorities cited notes 130, 141, 154-55 infra. See also A. DENIsov
& M. KIRCHENKO, 4 SovIET STATE LAW 17 (Moscow ed. 1960); Strogovich Problems of Methodology in Jurisprudence, Viprosy filosophii, No. 12, 1965, translated in 5 SoviET LAw AND GovERNmENT, No. 4, Spring 1966, at 13, 20.

For

earlier Soviet approaches to law and legal theory's educational role, see Chkhidvadze,
Socialist Law - Important Weapon in Fight for Communism, Izvestia, July 2, 1952, at
2-3, translatedin 4 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SoviET PRESS, No. 27, Aug. 16, 1952, at
3, 11; Polyansky, The Soviet Criminal Court as a Conductor of the Policy of the Party
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tant than the theoretical exclamations concerning the educational
role of Soviet legal institutions are the actual structure and operational approaches of some of these institutions - which include certain social organizations and the antiparasite or "refusal to work"
laws, as well as the Soviet courts.
A.

The Role of Social Organizations

Since the death of Stalin certain governmental functions within
the Soviet Union have been gradually assumed by social organizations such as the People's Volunteer Militia and the Comrades' Courts.
Professor Berman has pointed out: "These organizations have a dual
parental function: they bring the will of the 'collective' to bear on
miscreants, and at the same time they educate the participants in
what Soviet writers call 'popular self-government.' "110 The formalized social interaction encouraged by these social organizations not
only unidirectionally creates appropriate public opinion or lawconsciousness in individuals, but also allows and even encourages
the "will of the collective" to achieve relatively new consensual content through these social organizations - that is, to a certain extent
the content of public self-government is overtly susceptible to progressively changing societal mores and other social norms.
1. The People's Volunteer Militia."- The People's Volunteer
Militia (narodynaya militsia), or "People's Patrols," was established
in the post-Stalin period to act alongside the regular Militia (police
force) in keeping law and order in public places." 2 The Volunteer
and the Soviet Regime, Vesmnik moscovskovo universiteta, No. 11, Nov. 1950 (published
Mar. 1951), at 125-39, translatedin 4 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 6,
Mar. 22, 1952, at 8; Review of the Press: Noble Task, Pravda, Dec. 9, 1951, at 2, translated in 3 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 49, Jan. 19, 1952, at 31.
110 H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 286.
111 See generally id. at 286-88; Morgan, The Peoples Justice: The Anti-parasiteLaw,
People's Volunteer Militia and Comrades' Courts, in 7 LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE 49,
61-69 (1963). For a survey of the general activities of the People's Volunteer Militia,
see Ritvo, Totalitarianism Without Coercion?, 9 PROBLEMS IN COMMUNISM, No. 6,
Nov.-Dec. 1960, at 23-24. See also Wesson, Volunteers and Soviets, 15 SOVIET STUDIES
231 (1964).
112 The 1960 R.S.F.S.R. Statute on the People's Volunteer Militia lists the following
tasks of the members:
(1) To maintain public order on streets, in stadiums, parks and other public
places, at meetings, demonstrations, sports events, etc.; (2) Together with police, court and Procuracy agencies, to combat petty crime ("hooliganism"),
drunkenness, theft, violations of trade regulations, speculations, moonshining,
and other offenses; (3) To enforce traffic regulations; (4) To combat neglect of
children; (5) To make suggestions to state and social organizations for taking
measures of influence against persons who violate public order; (6) To send
materials concerning offenders to Comrades' Courts or administrative agencies,
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Militia is similar in its function and physical composition to the
druzhiny or people's police of prerevolutionary Russia, and for this
reason the members of today's Volunteer Militia in the Soviet Union
are often referred to as "'druzhinniki."
The narodynaya militsia is composed of millions of volunteer
members, and its general purpose is to draw a relatively large segA member of the
ment of Soviet society into law enforcement."
Volunteer Militia has the duty of maintaining public order. To
carry out this duty, he may freely enter public places, demand that
a citizen stop violating the peace, and commandeer transportation
for the victim of a crime or accident. He may also draw up a
statement of violations and send it to the staff chief or druzhina
commander and, when necessary, take a violator before the staff
of the local People's Volunteer Militia, the regular police force, or
the nearest rural or village soviet. Serious cases are handed over
to the police for prosecution before the ordinary courts. Minof
cases are dealt with by reprimands or by transfer to the Comrades"
Courts."'

Professor Berman has pointed out that the Volunteer Militia
groups exercise specific educational functions in addition to those
powers that are normally exercised by regular police forces in most
other countries:
[The Peoples Patrolsi are concerned with anti-social activities
not amounting to crimes - for example, neglect of children. They
sometimes ridicule offenders in the press or on public display
boards ("Billboards of Shame"). They speak to general meetings
of workers and employees in enterprises and institutions. They
roam the city in pairs, taking issue with conduct of which they do
not approve, such as boisterous parties, drunkenness, wearing of
"Western" dothes, or dancing of "Western" dance steps .... The
aim of the People's Patrols is to establish an educational agency
for law-enforcement whose members will be an integral part of

to send [Volunteer Militia members] as social prosecutors where necessary,
and to report offenses in the press, wall newspapers, posters, window displays
and bulletins; (7) To participate in educational work among the population
concerning the observance of the rules of socialist community life and the
prevention of anti-social offenses. R.S.F.S.R. Statute on Voluntary People's
Patrols for the Protection of Social Order, Sovetskaya Iustitsiia [Soviet Justice], No. 5, (1960), in SPRAvOcHNICK DRUZHINNiKA [Patrolman's Handbook] 16 (1961), translated in H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 287.
See also Morgan, supra note 111, at 63.
i3.The leading members of these Volunteer Militia groups, however, are usually
party members or Komsomol (Young Communist League) members.
114 H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 286-88.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22: 157

the society itself, who will, in the words of the 1960 statute, "be
an example in work and in everyday life.""i 5

The Secretary of the Leningrad City Party Committee has commented
that:
[T]he work of druzhinniki constantly exceeds the limits of patrolling the streets, and is turned into daily educational work with
people. The druzhinniki already do not limit themselves to information about violators at their place of work; they go to the en-

terprises, establishments and organizations where they speak to
general meetings of workers and employees, appearing thereby as
initiators of the public censure of violators. The authority of the
druzhinniki among the toilers is rapidly increasing. They consult with them more and more often on problems of their children's education, family relations; they ask advice and help in such
apparently do not come within the
matters which at first glance
6
duties of the drzzhinniki.11

There is no real parallel in American society for the Soviet
People's Volunteer Militia. Some residential districts in large metropolitan areas of the United States have organized citizen police forces,
but these are generally protective associations rather than coercive or
educational bodies. The only legal manifestation of citizen police
power in the United States is the "citizen's arrest"; however, it can
be argued that the heuristic and "'parental" functions of the Soviet
People's Volunteer Militia are exercised in the United States by more
informal (and perhaps equally effective) social forms of coercion.
2. Comrades' Courts."iT-In 1959 Premier Nikita S. Khruschev
stated before the 21st Party Congress:
Many functions performed by government agencies will gradThe time has come when
ually pass to social organizations ....
more attention should be paid to the Comrades' Courts, which
should seek chiefly to prevent assorted kinds of law violations.
They should hear not only cases concerning behavior on the job
115 Id. at 288. See also Editorial, On People's Volunteer Detachments and Street
Patrols, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 11, June 1965, at 51, translated in 17 CURRENT DIGEST
OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 32, Sept. 1, 1965, at 22.
11
6 Boikova, in SOVETSKAIA OBSHCHESTVENNOST' NA STRAZHE SOTSIALISTICHESKOI ZAKONNOSTI 119-20, quoted in Morgan, supra note 111, at 64. See also
Savitsky, Simply to Be a Volunteer is Not Enough, Izvestia, June 25, 1967, at 3, translated
in 18 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 25, July 13, 1966, at 31.
i7 See H. BERmAN, supra note 14, at 83-84, 288-91; Berman & Spindler, Soviet
Comrades' Courts, 38 WASH. L. REV. 842 (1963); Hammer, Law Enforcement, Social
Control and the W1ithering of the State: Recent Soviet Experience, 14 SOVIET STUDIES
379 (1963); Morgan, supra note 111, at 57-61; Ritvo, supra note 111, at 25-26; Taras,
Social Courts in the U.S.S.R., 14 SOVIET STUDIES 398 (1963); ci. Berman, The Cuban
Popular Tribunals, 69 CoLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1969); Brown, The Disputes and Arbitration Commissions: Social Organs for the Administration of Justice in the German
Democratic Republic, 1 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 5 (1968).
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but also cases of everyday deportment and morality, and cases of
improper conduct by members of the group who disregard standards of social behavior. 1 8
The Comrades' Courts (tov;,rishcheskiye sudy) were first set up
in 1919 in a number of factories and apartment buildings to deal
with petty crimes and antisocial activity. These social organizations
functioned effectively during the 1920's, but they gradually fell into
disuse during the 1930's when Stalin's severe criminal law legislation removed much of their jurisdiction. After 1939 little was
heard of the Comrades' Courts until they were revitalized in
1959 to deal with comparatively minor and quasi-legal offenses. At
present there are enactments governing Comrades' Courts in almost
all of the Soviet Republics. In the Russian Republic (R.S.F.S.R.)
these social organizations are now governed by the Decree of July 3,
1961, which has subsequently been amended by the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. to increase the jurisdiction of the
Comrades' Courts."' This broadening of jurisdiction suggests that
the government's current policy is to encourage these nonprofessional
and informal tribunals and to relieve the People's Courts of a number of minor offenses which can best be handled by the Comrades'
Courts.
The main functions of the Comrades' Courts in the Soviet Union
are to prevent violations of the law and offenses which are considered harmful to society, to educate people by persuasion and social
influence, to create an atmosphere of intolerance towards antisocial
and "parasitic" acts, and to develop and consolidate cooperative
relations between citizens. 20
11

STranslated in H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 285-86; Morgan, supra note 111,
at 57.
11) R.S.F.S.R. Statute of July 3, 1961, on Comrades' Courts (1961), as amended,
Jan. 16, 1965, translated in BASIc LAws ON Tm STRucrTuR oF THE SoVIET STATE
265 (H. Berman & J. Quigley, Jr., transls. & eds. 1968).
120 The 1961 R.S.F.S.R. Statute on Comrades' Courts (as amended through January
16, 1965) describes the function of the Comrades' Courts as follows:
Comrades' courts are elective social agencies called upon actively to foster the
education of citizens in the spirit of a communist attitude toward labor [and)
socialist ownership and the observance of the rules of socialist community life,
and the development among Soviet people of a sense of collectivism and comradely mutual assistance and of respect for the dignity and honor of citizens.
The most important aspect of the work of comrades' courts shall be the prevention of violations of law and misconduct that cause harm to society, the
education of people through persuasion and social pressure, and the creation
of conditions of intolerance toward any antisocial acts. Comrades' courts shall
be invested with the trust of the collective, shall express its will, and shall be
responsible to it Id. art. 1.
This statute is discussed at length in Berman & Spindler, supra note 117, at 857-95.
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Comrades' Courts can be set up in factories, apartment buildings,
collective farms, and universities - anywhere there are at least 50
(and in certain cases fewer than 50) people living or working. In
1969 it was estimated that more than 40,000 people in Moscow alone
were taking part in the work of the Comrades' Courts at their places
of work and places of residence.' 2 ' Comrades' Courts are composed
of a panel of three or five judges, chosen by majority vote at an
open election (not by secret ballot), who serve for a term of 1 year.
The 1961 R.S.F.S.R. statute does not specify the qualifications for
judges of these courts, but in practice they are usually chosen from
among the employees with the longest service.
Despite their comparatively nonprofessional and informal character, the Comrades' Courts are required to have a secretary, to make
transcripts of their proceedings, and to keep proper records. They
have power by law to summon witnesses, and if the directions of their
decisions are not complied with, the respective People's Court can
levy execution in the same way that execution is levied on property
belonging to convicted persons who have not complied with the
civil judgments of such a People's Court. The Comrades' Courts
may at any time transfer a case directly to a People's Court if the
case appears to be more serious than was originally thought or if
more thorough investigation is required.
The respective statutes of the various Soviet Republics allow the
Comrades' Courts to become involved in the legal processing of a
wide variety of quasi-crimes. The cases with which the Comrades'
Courts are concerned can be divided into four general categories:
(1) labor discipline, which includes cases heard by the factory
courts involving "slackers," absenteeism, constant lateness for work,
poor quality work, failure to observe safety regulations and fire
precautions, carelessness resulting in damage to machinery or stock,
and drunkenness or general carelessness on the job; (2) cases arising
out of social relations, which are usually heard by the apartment
building courts and which include cluttering corridors in crowded
tenant apartment buildings, using foul language, spreading malicious
and unfounded rumors about neighbors or colleagues, failing to
give proper assistance to a sick or injured citizen, engaging in unworthy conduct towards women, and failing to bring up one's children properly or to care for and support one's aged parents; (3)
antisocial acts, which is a broad and general category for such acts
121 Gogolev, The Shield of Order, Pravda, Nov. 11, 1969, at 2, translated in 21
CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 45, Dec. 3, 1969, at 25.
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as "hooliganism," -drunkenness, minor speculation, parasitism, illicit
use of government transport for private purposes, petty thefts,
"moonshining" or the illegal production of alcoholic beverages, and
certain misdemeanors which are sometimes transferred to the Comrades' Courts from the regular courts; and (4) civil disputes, which
include disputes over property where the value does not exceed 50
rubles and where both parties consent to the matter being heard by
122
a Comrades' Court.
The Comrades' Courts are "social organizations" in the sense
that they are staffed by lay volunteers rather than civil servants,
they purportedly perform a persuasive rather than a coercive function, and their decisions are supposed to be carried out voluntarily.2 3
122
The list of matters which can be heard by a Comrades' Court is set forth in the
R.S.F.S.R. Statute of July 3, 1961, on Comrades' Courts, art. 5 (1961), as amended,
Jan. 16, 1965, translated in BASIC LAWS ON THE STRUCTURE OF TE SOVIET STATE,
supra note 119, at 265. See also Morgan, supra note 111, at 58-59.
Berman & Spindler, supra note 117, at 842. The social nature of the Comrades' Courts is reflected in the sanctions which they can apply. These social sanctions
are outlined in article 15 of the R.S.F.S.R. Statute on Comrades' Courts as follows:
A comrades' court may apply the following measures of pressure to an offender: (1) oblige [him) to apologize publicly to the victim or the collective;
(2) announce a comradely warning, (3) announce a social censure; (4) announce a social reprimand, with or without publication in the press; (5)
impose a money fine up to 10 rubles if the offense is not connected with a
violation of labor discipline, and a fine up to 30 rubles for cases of petty
stealing of state or social property, and up to 50 rubles for repeated petty
stealing; (6) place before the director of the enterprise, institution, or organization the question of applying one of the following measures in accordance
with the labor legislation in force: transferring the offender to lower-paying
work or demoting him; (6a) place before the director of the enterprise, institution, or organization the question of dismissing, in the established procedure, a
person who performs work connected with the education of minors or youth, or
work connected with the disposition or keeping of valuable items, if the comrades' court, taking into account the character of the offenses committed by such
person, considers it impossible to entrust such work to him in the future;
(6b) place before the director of the enterprise, institution, or organization
the question of assigning persons who have committed petty hooliganism,
petty speculation, petty stealing of state or social property, theft of inexpensive articles of personal consumption or everyday use, beatings, or light bodily
injuries, to unskilled physical labor in the same enterprise, institution, or organization for a period of up to 15 days with pay for the work fulfilled; (7)
raise the question of evicting the offender from the apartment he occupies if it
is impossible to live with him or if he has a predatory attitude toward housing
resources; (8) a comrades' court may, in addition to applying the measures
of pressure provided by sections 1-7 of the present article, oblige the offender
to make compensation, in an amount not exceeding 50 rubles, for damage
caused by his illegal acts. When considering cases of petty speculation, a comrades' court shall adopt a decision to transfer the articles of petty speculation
to the income of the state. In cases of stealing of state or social property,
the comrades' court in all instances must oblige the offender to make full
compensation for material damage that has been caused. R.S.F.S.R. Statute
of July 3, 1961, on Comrades' Courts, art. 15 (1961), as amended, Jan. 16,
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Proceedings of the Comrades' Courts are often widely publicized and are occasionally filmed for television or the newsreels. The
1961 procedural manual of the Comrades' Courts stresses the desirability of public apology by the offender and the encouragement
of attendance and participation at the trial by the accused's fellow
workers and neighbors. The offender's subsequent conduct is followed by the Court.'2 4
Soviet jurists have estimated that the number of higher court
cases diminished by 25 percent in the first year after the adoption of
the Comrades' Court statutes in 1961.125 Although there have been
acknowledged abuses of the Comrades' Court system and complaints
of misapplication of law and of decisions exceeding jurisdictional
competence, "they have failed to justify the worst fears."' 2 6
The Comrades' Courts are intended to function as courts of
morals as well as courts of law. This synthesis of law and morality,
which blurs the distinctions so carefully drawn by the 19th century
philosophers of jurisprudence both on the continent of Europe and
in Anglo-American legal thought, is based on the Marxian theory
that law will "wither away" along with the state as the true communist society gives conscious birth to itself. After the gestation
period of socialism, public opinion, as expressed and impressed
through the consensus of one's neighbors and fellow workers, will
take the place of legal coercion, and to this extent the Comrades'
Courts are a foretaste of the kind of social control which will exist
1965, translated in BAsIc LAWs ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE,

supra note 119, at 271-72.
See also Gutsenko, Dobrovolskaya & Raginsky, Comrades' Courts Are a Collective Educator, Izvestia, Oct. 21, 1959, at 2, translated in 11 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
PRESS, No. 42, Nov. 18, 1959, at 21.
124 See H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 290-91, citing PRAKTICHESKOE POSOBIE
DLIE TOVARICHESI(IKH SUDOV [PRACTICAL MANUAL FOR COMRADES' COURTS] 35-38,

40, 46, 55-56, 75 (K.S. Iudel'son ed., Moscow 1961).

125 See H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 297.
126 F .BARGHOORN, POLITICS IN THE USSR: A COUNTRY STUDY 346 (1966). See
Berman & Spindler, supra note 117, at 898-906; O'Connor, Soviet Procedures in Civil
Decisions: A Changing Balance Between Public and Civil Systems of Public Order, in
LAw IN SOVIET SocIETY 51, 90-92 (W. Lafreve ed. 1965). Professors Berman and
Spindler have indicated:
It would be a mistake to discount the Soviet claims of success as mere
propaganda, or to judge them by standards appropriate to our own conditions.
Given the relatively crowded apartment houses, low living standards and production pressures of Soviet life, and the relative weakness of traditional social
controls exercised in other societies by voluntary church, welfare, neighborhood, professional and other agencies, the Comrades' Courts can play an important role in maintaining peace, order and morale in the units in which they
operate. The 1961 Statute is carefully and intelligently drafted to promote
these ends. Berman & Spindler, supra note 117, at 896.
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in the communist society of the future. 27 Thus, the Supreme Court
of the Russian Republic has spoken of the "changes and additions
aimed at improving the work of the Comrades' Courts in the communist upbringing of the working people ....
It is safe to assume, as at least one Soviet writer has, that "in
many instances the public could exert a much stronger influence on a
wrongdoer than [a more formal) court trial would."'1 29 One Soviet
jurist has called the Comrades' Courts "an effective form of moral
influence upon violators of the rules of the socialist community,"
and he claims that "a person facing a court of his comrades feels as
if he were before the court of public consdence."' 8 The Comrades'
Courts' reliance on public influence, however, deprives that system of
many of the safeguards of traditional legal institutions, "including
right -to counsel, presumption of innocence, precise formulation of
issues, precise definitions of offenses, and evidentiary standards of
relevance and materiality."''
Furthermore, the Comrades' Courts
use lay adjudicators rather than professionally trained judges. And
although their sanctions and means of coercion are often only social
for example, public apology, warnings, and public censure the Comrades' Courts may also impose, among other sanctions, fines
up to 10 rubles, proposed job transfers, demotions, evictions, and
may require payment of damages up to 50 rubles. 32
The possibility of injustice is somewhat minimized, however, because sanctions are generally mild and offenses charged are those of
'

27

See E. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTiON TO THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 158

(1969).
128 Presidium of Russian Republic Supreme Soviet, What Is New In Work of
Coparades' Courts, Izvestia, Oct 25, 1963, at 3, translated in 15 CURRENT DIGEST OF
THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 43, Nov. 20, 1963, at 29.
129 Anashkin, Concerning the Public Courts, Izvestia, Dec. 14, 1956, at 2, translated in 8 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 50, Jan. 23, 1957, at 27. See
also Gutsenko, Dobrovolskaya & Raginsky, supra note 123, at 21-22; Kaznin, Court of
Comrades, Pravda, Nov. 13, 1963, at 4, translated in 15 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
SOVIET PRESS, No. 47, Dec. 18,1963, at 10.
13 0 Mirenov, Strengthen Legality and Law and Order, Pravda, May 8, 1964, at 2,
translatedin 16 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 19, June 3, 1964, at 1718. See also FUNDAMENTALS OF SOVIET LAW 443-84 (P. Komashkin ed. & Y. Gdobnikov transl., no date); Petrov, From the Experience of the Work of Comrades' Courts,
Sovetskaya Iustitsiia, No. 5, 1960, at 9, translated in J. HAzARD & I. SHAPIMO,
THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: POST-STALIN DOCUMENTATION A2D HISTORICAL COM-

MENTARY, pt. I, at 22 (1962); A New Stage in the Functioningof the Comrades, Courts,
Sovetskaya Iustitsiia, No. 23, 1963, translated in 3 SOVIET LAW AND GOVERNMENT,
No. 1, Summer 1964, at 35; Pokrovsky & Gershanov, What Comrades' Courts Should
Be Like, Izvestia, Apr. 3, 1959, at 2, translatedin 11 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
PRESS, No. 14, May 6, 1959, at 24.
131 Berman & Spindler, supra note 117, at 903.
32
' See note 123 supra.
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which the entire collective or community would have knowledge. It
can also be argued that additional legal refinements would detract
from the informal and distinctively "social" coercive nature of these
institutions.
A partial comparison can be made between the Soviet Comrades'
Courts and the numerous voluntary and often formally or informally
coercive organizations in the United States, such as "shop" committees in factories, Parent Teacher Associations, Neighborhood Committees, and Tenant Associations. A major difference between these
Soviet and American social organizations is that the Comrades'
Courts are pervaded by a sociopolitical ideology which justifies and
13 3
encourages state "parental" involvement.
B.

The Antiparasite and Refusal to Work Laws

In the Soviet Union, and also in most Western nations, there
are certain laws which perform heuristic and "parental" functions
within the sociolegal system. The Soviet antiparasiteand refusal to
work laws, which concern "persons avoiding socially useful work
and leading an antisocial and parasitic way of life," are one such
3 4
example.
The antiparasite laws, formulated as part of a public discipline
campaign under Nikita S. Khrushchev, provided for the calling of a
public meeting to pronounce judgment on those persons who were
living on "unearned" income. Prior to February 1970, "parasites"
could be sentenced to exile for 2 to 5 years by such a public meeting.
The Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R.,
"On Strengthening the Struggle Against Persons Who Refuse to
Engage in Socially Useful Work and Lead an Antisocial Parasitic
Way of Life,"' 1 5 enacted on May 4, 1961, and amended on Septem133 An American parallel might be drawn to the Federal Rent Supplement Program
of 1968, created under section 101 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965,
12 U.S.C. § 1701s (Supp. Ill, 1968), which authorizes rent supplements to members
of a cooperative - a residence managed by a democratically elected tenants' committee
with power to assess members and evict defaulters.
134 See generally H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 291-98; Berman, Introduction to
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PRocEDuRE: THE R.S.F.S.R. CODES 9-13 (H. Berman
& J. Spindler transls. 1966); Beerman, The Anti-Parasite Law of the RSFSR Modified,
17 SOVIET STUDIES 387 (1966); Beerman, The ParasiteLaw, 13 SOVIET STUDIES 191
(1962); Beerman, Soviet and Russian Anti-Parasite Laws, 15 SOVIET STUDIES 420
(1964); Lipson, The Future Belongs to . . .Parasites?, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM,
No. 12, June 1963, at 1; Morgan, supra note 111, at 50-57.
135 Law of May 4, 1961, On Strengthening the Struggle Against Persons Who Refuse to Engage in Socially Useful Work and Lead an Anti-social Parasitic Way of Life,
[1961] 6 Ved. Verkh. Soy. R.S.F.S.R. Item 401 (Supreme Soviet R.S.F.S.R.), translated
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ber 20, 1965, includes a comprehensive explanation of the role and
ultimate objectives of the antiparasite and refusal to work laws:
Our country, under the leadership of the Communist Party, has
entered the period of expanded construction of communism. Soviet people are working with enthusiasm at enterprises, construction projects, collective and state farms and institutions, performing
socially useful work in the family, observing the law and respecting
the rules of socialist community life.
However, in cities and in the countryside there are still individual persons who, though able to work, stubbornly do not wish
to work honestly and lead an antisocial parasitic way of life. On
collective farms such kind of persons, while enjoying the benefits
established for collective farmers, refuse to engage in honest work,
subvert discipline, and thereby inflict damage upon the artel's
economy.
The parasitic existence of these persons is as a rule accompanied by drunkenness, moral degradation and violation of the
rules of socialist community life, which have an adverse influence
on other unstable members of society.
It is necessary to wage a resolute struggle against antisocial,
parasitic elements until this disgraceful phenomenon is completely
eradicated from our society, creating around such persons an atmosphere of intolerance and general condemnation.
Taking into account the many expressions of desire on the part
of the working people that the struggle against antisocial elements
be intensified, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
R.S.F.S.R. decrees:
1. It shall be established that adult citizens able to work who
do not wish to fulfill a most important constitutional obligation honestly to work according to their capacities - and who refuse
to engage in socially useful work and lead an antisocial parasitic
way of life, shall be enlisted, by decision of the executive committee of the district (or city) soviet of working people's deputies,
in socially useful work in enterprises (or construction sites) located
in the district of their permanent residence or in other places
within the boundaries of the same region, territory, or autonomous
republic.
Persons who refuse to engage in socially useful work and lead
an antisocial parasitic way of life who live in the city of Moscow, in
the Moscow Region, or in the city of Leningrad shall be subjected,
by decree of a district (or city) people's court, to resettlement in
specially designated localities for a term of two to five years with
enlistment to work in the place of settlement.
Mainly as a result of pressure from the Soviet legal profession, the
1965 amendments to the R.S.F.S.R. Edict (quoted in part above) inin 13 CuRRENT DIGEST OF THE SoviET PRESS, No. 33, Sept. 13, 1961, at 8-9, and in

H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 291-94, as amended, Edict of Sept. 20, 1965, of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R., [1965) 38 Ved. Verkh. Soy.
R.S.F.S.R. Item 932 (Supreme Soviet R.S.F.S.R.), translated in H. Berman, Comparison of Soviet and American Law: Supplementary Materials, Harvard Law School, 1970,
at 11-14 to 11-17.
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troduced a number of procedural safeguards relating to the trial and
judgment of "parasites." According to the amended Edict, charges
against persons believed to be leading a parasitic way of life must
be confirmed by the police, who are obligated to issue a warning
to the individual in question. The execution of a resettlement
decree imposed on an individual found guilty of leading a parasitic
way of life must be supervised by the local administrative authority.
Although the sentence imposed is normally not subject to appeal by
the guilty individual, the procurator's office can protest confirmation of a sentence to a higher regional authority. In addition, the
antiparasite laws are now generally being enforced by the courts
rather than by public meetings.""
But the antiparasite laws were still not without their faults, and
many jurists both inside the Soviet Union and abroad criticized them
because they lacked solid legal foundation. These jurists argued that
persons charged with being "parasites" were not given full due process of law since the antiparasite legislation had not been included in
the criminal codes of the various Soviet Republics. As a result of
this criticism, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R.
on February 25, 1970, quietly replaced its controversial antiparasite
law with a new criminal regulation that forces people to engage in
"socially useful work" or face up to a year in prison or in a labor
camp. 137 The major change effected by this newly revised anti136 Speaking of the R.S.F.S.R. antiparasite law prior to its 1965 amendment, Professor
Berman noted:
This statute, with all its defects, is a considerable improvement over the
earlier anti-parasite laws enacted by the various smaller republics in the years
from 1957 to 1960, which were even more vague in their definitions and
which provided for no judicial administration whatever, leaving offenders entirely at the mercy of "the public." . . . [T]he limitations introduced into the
statute reflect a certain compromise with [the "strict legality" school], and an
effort to reconcile the parental features of the law with the more objective
standards which have characterized the reform movement since Stalin's death.
H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 294.
137 The new antiparasite or "refusal to work" law further amends articles 1 to 6 of
the 1961 Edict so that these articles now read as follows:
1. To establish that able-bodied legally adult citizens who do not wish to
perform a major Constitutional duty - to work honestly according to their
capabilities - who avoid socially useful work and who lead an antisocial,
parasitic way of life are liable to be brought before internal affairs agencies for
an official warning that their parasitic existence is impermissible and that
they must accept employment within a period of 15 days.
2. Persons who avoid job placement and who continue to lead an antisocial, parasitic way of life after having been officially warned in accordance
with Art. 1 of the present decree are enlisted, by decision of the executive committee of a district (or city) Soviet, in socially useful work at enterprises (or
construction projects) situated in the district where they reside permanently or
in other places within the given province, territory or autonomous republic.
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parasite law is that those persons found to be "parasites" are no

longer subject to exile.
Prior to 1970 the Soviet antiparasite laws emphasized their societal disinfectant role. The primary function of these criminal
regulations was to rid cities and collective farms of undesirable persons so that their apathetic attitude would not be a contagious influence on their neighbors and fellow workers. The work-stimulus
feature of these earlier laws appeared to be of secondary importance.
In comparison, the newly revised law is directly aimed at influencing
individuals to engage in "'socially useful" activity in line with the
current drive in the Soviet Union to increase the size of the labor
force and to tighten labor discipline. 8" As did the Edict of
1965, discussed above, the new antiparasite law, or, more accurately,
"refusal to work" law, provides that a person accused of living a
parasitic way of life be given a warning by the police stating that
3. The management and public organizations of enterprises (or construction projects) where persons avoiding socially useful work have been sent to
work are obliged to provide jobs for them, conduct educational work with
them and adopt measures for their assignment to production collectives.
The management of the enterprises (or construction projects) is obliged to
see to it that the Soviet that made the decision on the placement of such persons
is informed, within three days, of all cases involving their dismissal.
4. The exposure of persons avoiding socially useful work and leading an
antisocial, parasitic way of life and the verification of all the relevant circumstances are carried out by internal affairs agencies on the basis of materials in
their possession, at the initiative of state and public organizations and on the
basis of citizens' complaints. The verification is to be carried out within
a period of 10 days.
If, even after an official warning, such persons do not take the path of an
honest life of labor, the internal affairs agencies send the materials about them to
the executive committee of the district (or city) Soviet, which examines these
materials, within a period of 10 days, in the presence of the persons who have
avoided socially useful work.
5. The internal affairs agencies are responsible for supervising the execution of the decisions of the executive committees of districts (or city)
Soviets on sending such persons to work.
6. In cases where persons leading an antisocial way of life maliciously
avoid the implementation of the decision of the executive committee of the
district (or city) Soviet on job placement and termination of parasitic existence,
the management of the enterprise (or construction project) is obliged to report this, within five days, to the internal affairs agencies so that the question
may be decided of whether to bring criminal charges against such persons in
accordance with Art. 209/1 of the Russian Republic Criminal Code. Translated in 22 CURENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 16, May 19, 1970,
at 32.
138The revised antiparasite law of the R.S.F.S.R. claims constitutional justification
for its existence, and indeed article 12 of the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union
provides that "[w~ork in the U.S.S.R. is a duty and a matter of honor for every ablebodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: he who does not work, neither shall he
eat. The principle applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of socialism: from each according to
his ability, to each according to his work." U.S.S.R. FED. CONST. art. 12 (1936).
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he should find suitable work. If the individual does not find such
work within 15 days, the local government is compelled to assign
him a job in the general region where he lives. If he then "maliciously refuses" to work, he is liable to criminal charges under a new
section of the R.S.F.S.R. criminal code' 39 and could face up to a
year's deprivation of freedom or corrective tasks for the same period.
Although the antiparasite laws in the Soviet Union are currently
undergoing a period of change and reevaluation, it is unlikely that
they will be abolished entirely. A new refusal to work law similar
to that of the R.S.F.S.R. has been promulgated in at least one other
Soviet Republic (Central Asian Republic of Tadzhikistan), and it
can be assumed that the newly revised R.S.F.S.R. law will eventually
be adopted and applied in all the Soviet Republics.
The R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Court has continually emphasized the
educational purposes of the laws which attempt to prevent citizens
from leading an antisocial parasitic way of life in its decree "On
Strengthening the Struggle Against Parasites." The following statement is an example:
The important significance of the edicts of the presidiums of the
supreme soviets of union republics which provide responsibility
for an antisocial parasitic way of life lies in their preventive, prophylactic pressure. The basic purpose of legislation on strengthening the struggle against parasitic elements is to bring persons who
are leading an antisocial way of life to honest work. . . . Consideration of materials on parasitic elements in open juridical sessions held in city and rural clubs and at circuit sessions in enterprises, collective farms and state farms, attracts the broad attention
of the workers and creates a setting of intolerance and general
censure with respect to persons who lead an antisocial parasitic
way of life. . . . Consideration of materials concerning persons
who lead a parasitic existence must secure the proper application
of measures of administrative pressure provided by law, and must
have the purpose of bringing such persons to socially useful work
140
and of warning other persons against similar antisocial conduct.
The Soviets also recognize that intragroup social pressure and
censure can be inherently more effective in some situations than the
139 Decree of Feb. 25, 1970, On Additions and Amendments to the Russian Republic Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes, [19701 14 Ved. Verkh. Soy. R.S.F.S.R.
Item 256, at 177-78 (Supreme Soviet RS.F.S.R.), translated in 22 CuRRENT DIGEST
OF THE SovIET PREss, No. 16, May 19, 1970, at 32.
140 On the Practice of Application by the Courts of Legislation on Strengthening
the Struggle Against Persons Who Avoid Socially Useful Work and Lead an Antisocial
Parasitic Way of Life, Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., No.
6, Sept. 12, 1961, reported in BULLETIN OF SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.S.R., No. 5,

1961, at 8-11, translated in H. Berman, supra note 135, at 11-1, 11-2, 11-4.

See also

Mirenov, Persuasionand Compulsion in Combatting Anti-Social Acts, Kommunist, No.
3, 1961, translated in 2 SOVIET REV., No. 9, Sept. 1961, at 54.
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more formal means of legal coercion. The R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Court
has stated:
In the consideration of materials concerning antisocial parasitic
elements the courts do not always secure the link with the broad
public that is necessary for the attainment of the goals of preventive and educational pressure.... It is necessary for the courts
in their activity to direct a broad summoning of society to the consideration of materials about such persons, creating a setting of
intolerance towards antisocial parasitic elements and the general
censure of idlers.... In determining measures of administrative
pressure, courts must individualize them on the basis of the concrete circumstances and the personality of the law-violator ...
For the purpose of strengthening the educational significance of
judicial trials of persons who lead a parasitic way of life, such trials
should be conducted more frequently in enterprises, in collective
farms, and in city
and rural dubs, with attraction of the attention
41
of the public.'
From the unidirectional perspective, the Soviet State's "parental,"
educating, and opinion-creating functions, as they relate to the refusal to work and antiparasite laws and to antisocial behavior in
general, are necessary for the socialist society's movement toward an
ideological system of economic distribution according to individual
needs. In order to attain such a goal, it is necessary to create intragroup social pressures and personal self-corrective attitudes which
will maintain that sense of moral and legal obligation which under
more individualistic systems is supported additionally by strong
material incentives. Professor Berman has analyzed these functions
within the Soviet system in terms of representing a certain concept
of the idealized new Soviet man:
Social courts, and also the administrative procedure for resettling
"antisocial elements," reflect a particular conception of the nature
of man and of his relationship to law. Man is conceived to be in
need of education, guidance and training to make him better-disciplined, more honest and hard-working, more conscious of his
social obligations. Law is conceived as having a special role to
play in bringing about this result. Soviet "legal man" is not the
141 On the Practice of Application by the Courts of Legislation on Strengthening
the Struggle Against Persons Who Avoid Socially Useful Work and Lead an Antisocial
Parasitic Way of Life, Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., No.
6 Sept. 12, 1961, reported in BULLETIN OF SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.S.R., No. 5,
1961, at 8-11, translatedin H. Berman, supra note 135, at H1-2, HI-4, I-5. In discussing
the recent changes in the refusal to work and antiparasite laws, one Soviet commentator
has noted: "It is clear that our society cannot tolerate those who violate the rules of the
socialist community and do not wish to be associated with an honest life of labor. The
chief method of correcting manifestations of parasitism is the method of persuasion,
upbringing and assignment to socially useful labor." Rudenko, The Citizen and the
Law: Everyone is Obligated to Work, Pravda, July 11, 1970, at 3, translatedin 22 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 28, Aug. 11, 1970, at 17-18.
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independent, self-reliant, "rugged" individual of the past two, and
possibly four, centuries of Western legal history. He is the more
dependent, more helpless "member of the group" who has be-

come increasingly characteristic of the legal traditions which have
been developing in Europe and America as well in the decades
since 1914.142

The refusal to work and antiparasite laws can be viewed as a
formalized or institutionalized means whereby the consensus of the
"productive" citizenry can be brought to bear on their relatively unproductive comrades in an attempt to socially and legally coerce parasitic laggards out of their economic lethargy and dependency and
into a mental frame of reference which accepts the physical responsibilities of cooperative and mutually dependent economic advancement. In a planned economy, such as the Soviet Union's, where
community and individual economic benefits are directly related to
the nation's overall production, the ability of the working citizenry
to bring social and legal pressure to bear on those unproductive welfare recipients who are capable of actively participating in the production process is an economic necessity.
Interactionally, the heuristic and "parental" functions served by
the Soviet Union's antiparasite laws may be a more intelligent alternative than letting the local citizenry resort to anarchical or primordial
forms of self-help in an effort to rid their immediate communal society of individuals who willfully cause an economic and social drain
on the system. A major criticism of the institutionalized antiparasite law approach, however, is that it may have the ultimate effect of
thwarting individualism and progressive systemic change. In addition, these laws have given rise to instances of apparent injustice in
their operation due to the definitional vagueness inherent in the concept of a "parasite.' ' 14 But the recent revisions of these laws in the
R.S.F.S.R. can be viewed as a partial verification of the interactional effect brought about by the citizenry in the furtherance of
sociolegal change within the Soviet Union.
Obviously, the economic context and therefore the system of incentives (negative as well as positive) of a "market" system differ
142 H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 298. For an excellent discussion of the SovietMarxian concept of the perfectibility of man, see 2 J. PLAMENATZ, MAN AND SOCIETY:
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY, BENTHAM THROUGH MARx 402-08 (1963); K.
GRYZBOWSKI, SOvIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: DOCTRINES AND SOCIAL FUNcTIONs

165-71 (1962). See also E.FROMM, MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN 1-86 (1961); Cottier, Marx's Conception of Man, 8 NATURAL L.F. 97 (1963).
143 See, e.g., The Trial of losif Brodsky, THE NEW LEADER, Aug. 31, 1964, at 6,
10-11. Even the revised R.S.F.S.R. refusal to work and antiparasite regulation of 1970
does not specify what constitutes a "parasitic way of life."
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vastly from the Soviet situation. A comparison can be drawn, however, between the Soviet antiparasite laws and certain American
vagrancy laws, antiloitering ordinances, laws which make certain
forms of social behavior or social deviance a crime, and those laws
which make individual "status" (drug addiction) a criminal offense.1
Also noteworthy is the tendency in the United States for
legal sanctions and penalties to become more severe for the repetitious offender.

C. The EducationalRole of the Soviet Court
Article 3, paragraph 1, of the 1958 Fundamental Principles of
Legislation on the Judicial Structure of the U.S.S.R., the Union and
Autonomous Republics states:
By all its activities the court shall educate the citizens of the
U.S.S.R. in the spirit of devotion to the Motherland and the cause
of communism in the spirit of strict and undeviating observance of
Soviet laws, of care for socialist property, of labor discipline, of
honesty toward public and social duty, of respect for the rights,
honor
and dignity of citizens, for the rules of socialist common1
life. 45

Many Soviet jurists have noted the educational influence that the
court exercises upon the accused. In an address on "The Educational
Significance of the Soviet Court," delivered in 1947, Ivan T. Goliakov, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., stated
that the Soviet court exercises "the greatest possible influence ...

those who are called to a reckoning before

on

it." 146

144 See, e.g., Barry & Barry, A Tale of Two Laws and Two Poets, 3 MAXWELL REV.,
No. 1, Feb. 1967; cf. Handler & Hollingsworth, Work, Welfare, and the Nixon Reform Proposals,22 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1970).
145 Fundamental Principles of Legislation on the Judicial Structure of the U.S.S.R.,
the Union and Autonomous Republics, art. 3, 5 1 (1958), translated in H. BERMAN,
supra note 14, at 305.
Based upon these principles, the autonomous Republics of the Soviet Union have
enacted their various laws on court organization. The R.S.F.S.R. statute, for example,
reads in part as follows:
By all its activity a court shall educate citizens in the spirit of loyalty to the
Motherland and to the cause of communism, and in the spirit of strict and
undeviating execution of soviet laws, of an attitude of care toward socialist
ownership, of observance of labor discipline, of an honorable attitude toward
state and social duty, and of respect for the rights, honor, and dignity of citizens
and for rules of socialist community living. Law of Oct. 27, 1960, Court
Organization of the R.S.F.S.R., Tasks of the Courts, [1960] art. 3, as amended
through Sept. 9, 1968, translatedin BAsIc LAWS ON THE STRucTuRE OF THE
SOVIET STATE, supra note 119, at 216-17.
146 L T. GOLIAKOV, supra note 108, at 17. See also Gorshenin, The Soviet Court
and its Role in Strengthening Socialist Law, Kommunist, No. 2, 1955, at 63-73, translated in 7 CurtRNT DIGEsT OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 7, Mar. 30, 1955, at 18, 22;
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The Soviet criminal courts educate the defendant and the public
through the judge, the "teaching" sentence, and the encouragement
of public participation in trials. Professor Berman has outlined
seven features of Soviet criminal procedure, concerning both the
pretrial investigation and the active participation of the court in the
trial itself, which, though not necessarily unique to the Soviet system, illustrate the emphasis placed on the educational and "parental"
role of the Soviet court - an emphasis that has been carried further
in Soviet law than in any other modern legal system:
1. The preliminary investigation is directed toward clarifying the
entire situation in the mind of the accused as well as in the records
of the investigator.
2. The "entire situation" sought to be clarified includes not
merely the circumstances of the case, in the usual sense of that
phrase, but also the whole "case history" of the accused, including any past misconduct, his attitude toward the Revolution, his
entire motivation and orientation. In addition, the examiner is required to seek the answer to such questions as: Did the commission of the crime take place under coercion, threat, or by reason of
economic strain? Was the alleged offender at that moment in a
state of hunger or destitution? Was he influenced by extreme
personal or family conditions? Was he in a state of strong excitement?
3. Upon indictment, the trial commences with the court's interrogation of the accused directed, again, to his entire biography.
Whether or not he is a Party member, whether or not he has been
in trouble before, whether or not he has earned rewards for outstanding achievement of any kind, whether or not he took an honorable part in the Great Fatherland War - these and similar
questions make it clear that it is not simply the offensive act that
is to be punished or exonerated, but the man himself.
4. It is the duty of the court to protect the accused against the
consequences of his ignorance, to clarify to him his rights, to call
expert witnesses in his behalf when needed whether or not he so
requests. [The court will also appoint legal counsel for any defendant without a lawyer.]
5. On appeal the higher court not only reviews the entire case,
both on the law and on the facts, but may also receive evidence
not offered in the original trial.
6. The death of the convicted person does not prevent an appeal
or a reopening of the case if newly discovered circumstances may
lead to the rehabilitation of his reputation.
7. In imposing a sentence, the court has a large range of penalties from which to choose, including public censure, confiscation
of all or part of the criminal's property, a money fine in the form
of the monthly deduction of a certain percentage of the criminal's
pay (so-called "corrective" labor tasks), prohibition to carry on a
Gusov, Defend, But do not Shield: Notes of a People'sAssessor, Izvestia, Oct. 3, 1958, at
2, translated in 10 CuRRENT DIGEsT OF THE SOVIET PREss, No. 40, Nov. 12, 1958,
at 20, 21.
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particular trade or profession, exile from the city, banishment to
of liberty in corrective labor
remote areas, as well as deprivation
147
colonies and imprisonment.

The Soviet criminal courts educate and redirect the defendant
who has strayed from the path of acceptable behavior. 4 8 Presumably the judge's influence during the course of the trial makes the
defendant less likely to violate society's social and legal norms in
the future.
Soviet criminal procedure deals with the "whole man," but it
deals with him in a particular way, as a teacher or parent deals
with a child. The court is interested in all aspects of his development, and especially in his mental and psychological orientation,
because it is its task to try to "remake" him, or at least to make
him behave. The Soviet judge may upbraid or counsel the accused, explaining to him what is right and what is wrong in a
socialist society. Even if he is acquitted, the court may deliver an
official "admonition," that is, a warning of the dangers involved in
conduct which is in itself not criminal but which may lead to criminal activity. If he is convicted, the court imposes punishment as
disapproval or condemnation of both him and
a sign of the state's
14
his criminal act.
Closely related to the concept of the judge influencing the accused in trials in the Soviet Union is the role of the trial itself in
maintaining the sense of collective unity and in effectuating the collective purposes of the socialist society. Former Chief Justice Goliakov of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court has stated: "The publicity of our
court [procedure) means the attraction of the widest [public] into
the courts," and for this purpose, "the court arranges its sessions at
such time that is most favorable for the toilers to attend."' 50 The
court may also hold "'demonstration trials' of important criminal
' 47 H. BERMAN, supra note 14,at 305-06.
148

The educational and "parental" implications of the Soviet concept of law are also
found in civil procedure. "As in criminal procedure, the court in civil cases is concerned not merely with deciding the facts and issues before it, but also in clarifying them
to the parties." Id. at 309. Thus, article 16 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure
of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics states:
It is the duty of the court, without limiting itself to materials and pleadings
submitted, to take all measures provided by law for the detailed, full and objective elucidation of the real circumstances of the case, of the rights and duties
of the parties.
The court must explain to the persons taking part in the case their rights
and duties, must warn of the consequences of committing or not committing
procedural actions, and must render assistance to the persons taking part in the
case in realizing their rights. Translated in H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at
309.
149 d. at 307.
350 L T. GoLIAKov, supranote 108, at 17.
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cases in the enterprises and collective farms where the crimes were
committed." 5'
The idea of a trial serving as an instructive example to the rest
of the immediate community is not peculiar to the Soviet legal system. In the Soviet Union, however, there is an overt recognition of
this educative function of the legal system and also a general tendency to emphasize the use of criminal and civil trials for their educative effect. Quoting a speech by President Kalinin, former Chief
Justice Goliakov has stated:
"The judge who directs the case well, skillfully and in a Party
manner, is also always able to secure a good audience. People will
come to listen to him, to learn from him." The court is then
transformed into an instrument of propaganda for Soviet law and
the just foundations of our life; it teaches people how to live, work,
and behave under the conditions of Soviet society. Not only that:
by trying a case correctly, by disclosing the causes of crimes, the
court mobilizes the attention of the masses and 152arouses public
opinion to a struggle for the extirpation of crime.
The Court also teaches the patterns of exemplary behavior to the
members of the socialist society through the "teaching" sentence.
To aid in fulfillment of this task, the Soviet court has a large range
of penalties from which to choose when imposing a sentence upon
the convicted defendant. And the punishments prescribed in the
criminal codes often leave to the court's discretion a very large leeway between the minimum and maximum penalty. The choice and
application of a particular sentence or penalty to fit the particular
individual defendant - a feature not uncommon in many other
modern legal systems - is conceived of as having a twofold educational function. First, the sentence can be individualized to have
the maximum "teaching" effect upon the individual defendant found
151 H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 301. See Juviler, Mass Education and Justice in
Soviet Courts: The Visiting Sessions, 18 SOVIET STuDIES 494 (1967).
152 I. T. GOLIAKOV, supra note 108, at 17. See also Malyarov, The Law is for Everyone, Pravda, Jan. 13, 1970, at 3, translated in 22 CuRRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
PREss, No. 2, Feb. 11, 1970, at 27.
In a similar vein, another Soviet jurist has stated:
[E]ach case of application (in the broad sense of this word) of the norms of
socialist law can and must be employed not only to regulate the particular concrete situation in accordance with the requirements of the law, but also for its
educative effect upon the people affected by this situation or aware of it. Golusky, The Creative Role of Socialist Law in the Period of the Comprehensive
Building of Communism, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 10, 1961, translated in 1 SOVIET LAw AND GOVERNMENT, No. 1, Summer 1962, at 13, 22.
See also Blinov, IWho Knows the Law, Pravda, Jan. 24, 1967, at 2, translated in 19
CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 4, Feb. 15, 1967, at 28; Dicharov, Returning to the Subject: Knowledge of the Law, Pravda, May 18, 1967, at 2, translated in
19 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 20, June 7, 1967, at 22.
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guilty of a crime, taking into account his mental and psychological
orientation. Second, Soviet judges are supposed to be continually
aware of the effect of their decision upon the attitudes of the other
participants in the trial, including spectators, and upon the attitudes
of the public in general. Every decision of the court must therefore
be "as convincing as it is sound, so that not only [the judge] himself
and the people's assessors, but also all the persons attending the
15
session should.., understand [its] correctness.' 3
If properly selected and explained, the particular sentence applied
to the convicted defendant will presumably have an educational effect upon the observers of the trial and upon the public in general.
Such persons will recognize the inherent justice of the social norms
being legally enforced, and they will want to conform to them in
the future. Under such circumstances, the trial affects more persons
than just the defendant, and everyone will be less likely to become
an offender. One Soviet jurist has stated:
When the court individualizes penalties depending on the criminal's personality, when, after a public court hearing and a public
reading of the sentence, all those present dearly understand why
the court has chosen this particular measure of punishment, then
people's faith in the administration of justice grows stronger.
They begin to place a higher value on a conscientious attitude toward labor, on respectable behavior in society and on their place in
the collective. 154
Another Soviet writer has discussed the educational effect of the
properly selected and applied sentence upon the attitudes of the general public as follows:
All court activity does not have an educative effect - only that
which rests upon strict observance of legality in the activities of
the courts, realization of the principle of the equality of all citizens
before the law and the courts, and adherence to the requirement
that court decisions be just, that is, severe with respect to malicious
criminals, but lenient toward the individual who has accidently
strayed. 55
153 Address by President M. I. Kalinin, Tenth Anniversary of the Supreme Court of
the U.S.S.R., quoted in L T. GOLIAKOV, supra note 108, at 17.
154 Starodubsky, Only Through the Court, Izvestia, Sept 10, 1965, at 3, translatedin
17 CURRENT DIGEST OF T SOVIET PRESS, No. 36, Sept. 29, 1965, at 17.
155 Kulikov, Enhancing the Educational Role of Socialist Justice and Reinforcing
Legality in the Activities of Judicial Agencies, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 7,
1963, translated in 2 SOVIET LAW AND GOVERNMENT, No. 3, Winter 1963, at
33, 34. See also Dorgeyev, Jurists' Notes: The Authority of the Sentence, Izvestia, Jan.
4, 1967, at 3, translatedin 19 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 1, Jan. 25,
1967, at 27; Nanikishvili, Questions of Soviet Law: Logic of a Sentence, Izvestia, Aug. 9,
1967, at 3, translated in 18 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 33, Sept. 7,
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The courts in the Soviet Union have three kinds of sentences which
exert "social influence" upon the defendant in regular criminal proceedings. (1) Article 44 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.' 56
provides that if a court finds it inexpedient to send a convicted defendant to prison, it may suspend the sentence, and in addition, may
turn the offender over to a public organization or to the collective
of his fellow workers for reeducation and reform. (2) The criminal
codes of the various Soviet Republics provide further that an offender
may be turned over to a public organization or collective for reeducation and rehabilitation even without the formality of a trial or
actual conviction if the offender admits his guilt and the offense is
not a great social danger. 5 ' The offender put on such probation is
then expected to justify the faith of the collective and his fellow
workers by honest labor and by overt respect for the "norms of
socialist community life." This procedure differs from the suspended sentence in that the accused may be placed on probation at
any stage of the trial proceedings. Furthermore, an offender may
be put on probation not only by the trial judge, but also by the
procurator, the investigation judge, or even the police if such action
is approved by the procurator. (3) Under the criminal codes of the
various Soviet Republics, the trial court is authorized to transfer
minor crimes to a Comrades' Court in the case of first offenders. "8
This category of offenses includes minor assault, slander and insult,
and other violations where the "social influence" of the community
or collective may have a greater educational and prophylactic effect
than a fine or sentence.
From the interactional perspective the judge's concern with the
broad educational impact of each particular decision and sentence
can teleologically affect the immediate content of each such decision.
In this respect, teleology need not necessarily imply that an end-

1966, at 21; Strogovich, When Sentence is Pronounced, Literaturnaya gazeta, July
5, 1966, at 2, translated in 18 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 30,
Aug. 17, 1966, at 29; Teslenko, Punishment Should Fit the Criminal, Izvestia, Aug. 1,
1965, at 5, translatedin 17 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 31, Aug. 25,
1965, at 26; Viktorov & Mikhlin, Without Ignoring the Individual, Izvestia, Oct. 22,
1968, at 5, translated in 20 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 43, Nov. 13,
1968, at 22.
156 Translated in SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE R.S.F.S.R. CODES,
supra note 134, at 164-65.
15 7 See, e.g., THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R., art. 52, translated in SOVIET
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE R.S.F.S.R. CODES, supra note 134, at 169-70.
158 See, e.g., id. art. 51, translatedat 168-69.
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out-of-view controls or directs social change; generally, the concept
is associated with the doctrine that "goals or ends of activity are
dynamic agents in their own realizations."' 5 9 That the inherent
"justice" of a sentence must be readily comprehended by the judge's
immediate public and must be educational in its ultimate effect
creates the necessity for increased interaction (perhaps even subliminal) between the judge and his public, both present and future.
Indeed, there have been instances, reported in the Soviet newspapers,
where certain judges may have been unduly swayed by the passions
of the participating public during certain trials. 1 0°
The court educates the public by publicizing court proceedings,
encouraging public attendance at trials, and sometimes providing
opportunities for direct public participation in the judicial process.
Prior to promoting judicial action the investigating judge may survey
the opinion of the relevant residential or occupational group to learn
the facts of the dispute and the character and general conduct of the
litigants. This investigation can be undertaken'to obtain information and to determine local attitudes prior to the judicial trial of
first instance and sometimes prior to appellate review. Such a judicial survey of fact and local opinion may also be conducted at any
time during the trial. Sometimes officially recognized representatives of local groups participate in the actual trial, and it is common
for the bench to be removed to the physical locus and "social site"
of the dispute. Furthermore, although neither the Civil Procedure
Code nor the Criminal Code of the U.S.S.R. provides for spectator
participation in judicial trials, persons present are regularly given
permission to speak in conduct-related cases.
The vast majority of the civil and criminal trials in the Soviet
Union begin at first instance before a People's Court, composed of a
professional judge and two lay assessors. These lay assessors provide a further integrative link between the court and the public. The
higher courts, such as the District Courts and the Supreme Court of
the respective Union Republic, are mainly appellate courts, and appeals and reviews in these higher courts always come before a court
composed of three professional judges. But when these higher courts
acts as courts of first instance, the trial always proceeds before a court
159. NAGEL, THE STRucr= OF SCIEHCE3 402 (1961).
160 See, e.g., Galkin, The Court and Public Passions, Izvestia, Apr. 17, 1966, at 2,
translatedin 18 CuRRENT DIGEsT OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 16, May 11, 1966, at 12;

Perlov, Justice and Public Opinion, Izvestia, June 30, 1967, at 6, translated in 18
CuRRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 26, July 20,1966, at 20.
161
See generally O'Connor, supra note 126, at 51.
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composed of one professional judge and two lay assessors as in the
People's Courts.
Article 109 of the Federal Constitution of the U.S.S.R. states
that:
People's judges of district (or city) people's courts shall be
elected by the citizens of the district (or city) on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot for a term of five
years.
People's assessors of district (or city) people's courts shall be
elected at general meetings of workers, employees, and peasants at
the place of their work or residence, and
of military personnel in
162
military units, for a term of two years.

To be elected as either a judge or lay assessor, a person must be
at least 25 years old. And as prescribed by article 109, the lay assessors are directly elected for terms of 2 years. Assessors with special qualifications or expertise are often chosen to sit in a particular
case on the basis of their expertise - for example, an engineer may
be chosen to sit in a case involving industrial injuries.
As with the elected nonprofessional judges in the Comrades'
Courts, the lay assessors in the People's Courts provide an element
of lay participation in the administration of justice in the Soviet
Union. This function is generally served by the jury in common
law countries, and it maintains the phenomenon of "legal irrationality" (in Weberian terminology) in the Soviet judicial process. The
jury system was introduced into Imperial Russia in 1864. By commonly acquitting the accused in the face of conclusive evidence of
guilt, the Russian jury quickly gained the reputation of being notoriously lenient. Therefore the Soviet government abandoned the jury
system and adopted the use of lay assessors sitting with a professional judge and having equal rights with him - a concept borrowed
from certain German courts. s
Since the lay assessors are elected every 2 years, they are ultimately accountable to their local constituents. Much politicking can
occur between the candidates at election time, and such behavior has
been generally encouraged by the Soviet Government, which views it
as a means for increasing public awareness of socialist legality. The
lay assessors must periodically report back to their electors and give
an account of their stewardship. Furthermore, they may be recalled
by the electorate before their term of office has expired.
"Assessors need have no legal training, and in fact the majority
162 Translated in BASIC LAws ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE,

note 119, at 21-22.
163 E. JoHNsoN, supra note 127, at 124-25.
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have none, but on election they are given a handbook and have to
attend at least two lectures a month in a special course for People's
Assessors, the lectures being given by judges, practicing lawyers or
university law teachers."' 6 There is frequent concern, evidenced in
the Soviet newspapers, over the need for increased legal education
and training for the lay assessors.1 65 Even some of the judges of
the People's Courts do not have formal legal training when they are
elected and in such instances they are compelled to take a correspondence course in law. The risk of gross misinterpretation of the
law is not as great as it might be, however, because the procurator
must protest any decision of the courts he thinks is erroneous in its
legal content.
An additional educative and "parental" feature of the People's
Courts is their power to issue supplemental directions which usually
extend beyond the direct issues raised by the case. "Where a case
has revealed shortcomings, the person or organization responsible
may be ordered to take appropriate steps to prevent their recurrence;
and the courts are also required to satisfy themselves that their
supplementary directions have been complied with."'' 6

D. Summary
The present section has attempted to outline not only the theoretical bases for the educational role of Soviet legal institutions but
also the actual structure and operational approach of some of these
institutions, including certain social organizations (the People's Volunteer Militia and the Comrades' Courts), the antiparasite or refusal
to work laws, and the Soviet courts in their educational role.' In
addition, the heuristic function of law in the Soviet system is evinced
by the public's participation at all levels of the legal processes and
by the emphasis placed on personal and intragroup self-correction.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF A SOVIET SOCIOLOGY oF LAW
In light of the Soviets' emphasis on what have been interpreted
herein to be the educational and "parental," heuristic, and self164 Id.at 125.
165 See, e.g., Savitsky, Election of People's Assessors: Under Law and According to

Consciousness, Izvestia, Feb. 12, 1965, at 3, translated in 17 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
SOVIET PRES, No. 6, Mar. 3, 1965, at 31. Recently, a new handbook has been issued
for use by the people's assessors. See Ferfanov, Books: For People's Assessors, Izvestia,
Aug. 14, 1970, at 4, translated in 22 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 33,
Sept. 15, 1970, at 11.
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actualizing functions of law, it might be questioned why they have
not formulated a distinct and explicit sociology of law. In a book
published in Moscow in 1961 entitled The Individuality of the
Criminal and the Causes of Crime in the U.S.S.R., 0 7 Professor A.
Sakharov asserts that for some 25 to 30 years after the Revolution
the application of sociology and psychology to crime was avoided in
the Soviet Union because lawyers and social scientists feared that
such studies would necessarily lead them to the anthropological theories of positivistic criminology. Since the death of Stalin, however,
Soviet jurists have increasingly argued that the conditions and circumstances of a crime must be carefully studied so that the requirements of socialist law can be met and just sentences passed. For the
sociologically-oriented jurist, states Professor Sakharov, criminal responsibility is always specific and personal, and therefore the punishment should fit the criminal rather than the crime. Furthermore,
the ultimate goal of any penal sanction should be to rehabilitate and
reeducate the criminal so that he will not repeat the same or a similar
offense and so that he will become a cooperative participant in the
production processes of the socialist state. Idle hands are prone
to individualism, while shared work creates a sense of belonging
and mutual achievement. Before passing sentence the Soviet court
must first make a thorough investigation of the personality of the
accused person. This presupposes an examination of his conduct at
work, in everyday life, and within his family and the collective, his
age and family situation, the presence or absence of previous convictions, his services for the state, and similar factors.
This aspect of the sociology of Soviet law might be referred to
as its inherent "humanism." But one social theorist of the U.S.S.R.
is quick to assert that "[s]ocialist humanism has nothing in common
with Christian 'all-forgiveness'. Genuine humanism excludes a sentimentally pitying, indulgent attitude toward human weakness, shortcomings and vices.'

' 16 8

Although this statement provides evidence

of a failure or an unwillingness to understand the philosophical
content of Western humanism, the same Soviet theorist has intimated a concept of "socialist humanism" which might not be too
far removed from the accepted theories of criminal punishment in
our Western legal system:
67

A. SAKHAROV, 0 LICHNOSTI PRESTUPNIKA I PRICHINAKH PRESTEUPNOSTI V
SSSR (1961), reviewed, Beerman, 14 SOVIET STUDIES 85 (1962).
168 Anashkin, The Humanism of Soviet Criminal Law, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i
pravo, No. 8, 1963, at 44, translated in 15 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS,
No. 41, Nov. 6, 1963, at 9, 11.
1
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But humanism, as a principle upon which to base the application
of punishment, has two sides - not only a humane regard for the
individual who has committed a crime, but also the safeguarding
of Soviet society and its citizens against criminal encroachment, and
this latter presupposes, where necessary, the severe punishment of
persons who have committed grave crimes.' 6 9
In the formulative period of what may eventually become an
expressly recognized Soviet theory of the sociology of law, there
was a misguided attempt to relate criminal behavior to heredity and

a "biological predisposition" towards antisocial and criminal behavior. This misguided approach to criminology may have been
fostered by the phenomena of Lysenkoism - the belief in the hereditability of acquired characteristics - which was avidly promoted
under Stalin. The theory of "biological predisposition" towards
antisocial and criminal behavior is generally refuted in the Soviet
Union today, and it is not uncommon to find Soviet social theorists
making comments such as the following:
After all, each of us is biologically unique. When one's personality is formed under the influence of the social conditions of life,
one's natural characteristics also participate in this process. But
the point is that in and of themselves these characteristics are
neutral. Socially useful or socially harmful traits arise only in the
process of moral formation of the personality. . . . In fact, the
exclusion of "biological predisposition" guides us toward the ascertaining and elimination of circumstances that are conducive to lawbreaking, in living conditions themselves, in the immediate social
surroundings, in the social micro-environment1 70
There is some indication that Soviet jurists and social theorists
are becoming increasingly aware of the value of empirical sociological research and are beginning to formulate their own concepts of
the sociology of Soviet law based upon the tenets of Marxian historical materialism - the economic determination of law, Marxian
class analysis and the class character of law, and the withering away
of state and law in the communist society. For the Soviet sociologist,
as for most Western sociologists, at
each stage of historical development society represents a whole, a
specific social organization with its particular relations and laws.
The study of society as a historically developing whole, the study
of the laws of the succession of socio-economic formations, the investigation of the internal relationship of various aspects and
169 Id., translatedat 9.
170 Karpets, Kudryavtsev, Leontyev & Felinskaya, Questions of Soviet Law: The Nature of Lawbreaking, Izvestia, July 18, 1968, at 5, translatedin 20 CuRuENT DIGESr oF
THE SoviET PRFss, No. 29, Aug. 7, 1968, at 24, 24-25 [hereinafter cited as Karpets).
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these constitute the subject of soci-

ology.171

It has also been stated that: "The focus of attention of Marxist sociology is man in his relationship to surrounding reality in all the
diversity of his real ties and relations."' 7 2
For the Soviet-Marxist, concrete sociological research is concerned with the posing and solving of important social problems.
"Among these, first of all, are changes in the social structure of
society in the process of the transition to communism."' 3 Similarly,
it has been stated that
[o]nly scientific thinking can determine the direction of society's
development and set forth the concrete tasks of the masses' activity
in accordance with the objective laws and requirements of social
process.... The development of scientific knowledge about society,
as well as about nature, is connected with numerous complex processes of differentiation and integration of sciences, their interpretation and the establishment of new mutual links among them. 17 4
The nature and causes of lawbreaking in a socialist society have
recently been the subject of numerous studies and discussions within
the Soviet Union. The justification for such interest has been that
an effective struggle against lawbreaking and social norm infringement is possible only on a "scientific basis,""' and that intensive
research and study, coupled "with the use of the method of concrete
sociology, of questions of the interrelations, correspondence, and
mutual determination of aspects of the activity of a particular system of agencies and their individual components yields better substantiated conclusions and concrete proposals designed to enhance
the role of such organs. '
Studies of the sociopsychological and individual behavioral
traits of lawbreakers have been conducted in recent years in Moscow, Leningrad, Lvov, Latvia, and a number of other places. "They
171 Konstantinov & Kelle, HistoricalMaterialism - Marxist Sociology, Kommunist,
No. 1, 1965, translated in 17 CuRRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PREss, No. 8, Mar.
17, 1965, at 3.
172 Id., translated at 7 (emphasis omitted).
173 Id., translated at 6.
174 Id., translated at 3.
175 Karpets, supra note 170, translated at 24.
176 Zimanov, An Experiment in Introducing the Method of Copcrete Sociological
Research into Jurisprudence, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 12, 1964, translated in
4 SOVIET LAw AND GOVERNMENT, No. 2, Fall 1965, at 42, 43. This article indicates
that a sociological report written by U. Dzhekebaev, candidate of jurisprudence, entitled
"Questions of Improving the Effectiveness of the Struggle Against Persons Conducting
a Parasitic Way of Life," which was published in 1964, may have been influential in
bringing about changes and considerable reforms in the antiparasite laws.
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all show that the moral characteristics of lawbreakers are completely
determined by the complex interrelations between them and other
people, by influences, circumstances, and conflicts, by all their inter77
actions and by the external social micro-environment."'
The Soviets admit, however, that there are still a large number
of unsolved problems in the sphere of the correction and reeducation of lawbreakers, 7" and that empirical sociological research has
not been sufficiently implemented. "Social research, including concrete-sociological research, has not yet become a mandatory component part of the scientific guidance of social development in our
country. This gap must be dosed, for without such research theories
of communist relations and the shaping of the new man and of com79
munist consciousness cannot be correctly guided."'
Professor Kudryavtsev, in an Izvestia article entitled "The Law
and Sociology," has argued that Soviet jurists have a very powerful
and precise instrument in empirical sociological research for analyzing objective reality in the field of crime prevention. 80 He goes on
to state: "Juridical science and practice still make very little use of
the latest methods of sociological research, statistics, mass observations and public opinion studies. Jurists by habit confine themselves
to formal and logical categories and appeals to people's sentiments.
Such a 'method' cannot lead to optimum solutions.''
VI.

CONCLUSION

Within the nine categories of the sociological typology presented
in this artide, the Soviet legal system is characterized by its unique
emphasis on the educational and "parental," heuristic, and selfactualizingfunctions of law.
The Soviets acknowledge that their domestic law and legal institutions have an educational role to perform in the molding of the
character of the Soviet people. The sociological task of Soviet law
is to educate not only the immediate parties to a particular dispute,
177 Karpets, supra note 170, translated at 24.
178 Id., translated at 25. See also Gertsenzon, On the Study and Prevention of
Crime, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 7, 1960, at 78, translated in 12 CrUtRENT
DIGEsT OF THE SoviET PREss, No. 41, Nov. 9, 1960, at 3-6, 44.
17 9
Konstantinov & Kelle, supra note 171, at 6.
180 Kudryavtsev, The Law and Sociology, Izvestia, Nov. 23, 1965, at 3, translated in
17 CURRENT DIGEST Op THE SovIET PREss, No. 47, Dec. 15, 1965, at 28.
181 Id. Another Soviet jurist has stated that "[d]isregard for the sociological aspect
of legal phenomena and matters of public law is one of the principal reasons for the
backwardness of jurisprudence and for its significant isolation from the practice of building communism." Zimanov, supra note 176, at 42.
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but also the spectators, the participating public, and society as a whole
to be the kind of "new Soviet man" which the socialist state is seeking to develop. The ideal Soviet citizen should be hard-working,
honest, resourceful, cooperative, and above all conscious of his membership in a socialist society and aware of the obligations which result from this membership. That the Soviets have a political philosophy and ideology which stresses collective self-consciousness more
than individual initiative enables them to view law more readily in
terms of social mobilization and social dedication than in terms of
individual and private rights.
One Soviet jurist has effectively described the educational role of
socialist law as follows:
When Soviet doctrine speaks of the educational role of socialist law, it has in mind a very specific range of questions, namely:
the content of the law in effect (the principles and standards people learn from it); the clarity and accessibility of legislation to the
broadest masses of the people; the importance of conscious, voluntary compliance with the law (and not under fear of punishment);
the fact that regulation by law must, above all, persuade people
of the need and desirability of precisely a certain and not another
development of the given group of social relationships; and, finally, that the sanction in the application of a provision of law is
not an end in itself, but primarily
a means of education and of
82
preventing similar violations.'
Although the legal nature of the citizen's relationship to the state
can be described in terms of the "parental" function of law, this
concept must be interpreted from the viewpoint of the interactional
perspective; that is, in a very real sense the citizenry may be able to
predetermine the "content" of the law either by means of their
direct and general involvement in the sociolegal processes or by
means of internal systemic feedback resulting from the "childish"
rebellion or reaction to the authoritarian "parentalism" of the state.
Closely related to the educational and 'parental" function of
law within the Soviet system is the heuristic function; and this
article has attempted to indicate some of the methods by which individual and collective opinions concerning sociolegal relationships
are created or stimulated by the interaction that occurs within the
Soviet system between "the law" and "social behavior."
The Soviet legal system can also be characterized by the emphasis
placed on the self-actualizing function of law - that is, the role of
182 Tumanov, Failure to Understand or Unwillingness to Understand, Sovetskoe
gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 8, 1965, translated in 4 SovIET LAw AND GOVERNMENT,
No. 3, Winter 1965, at 3, 8.
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law as a means for the positive creation of a statement of rules for
orderly sociolegal change and as a means for goal attainment within
the context of planned or programmed systemic change. And, indeed, the social theorists of the U.S.S.R. continue to forecast the
eventual withering away of the state and its coercive legal institutions as the interim or transitional legal system of socialist law makes
provision for the gradual evolution of the socialist state into communist public self-government and for the complete eradication of
crime, coupled with the gradual replacement of measures of criminal
punishment by measures of an educational and self-correcting character.8

3

The concept of the self-actualizing function of law, how-

ever, has not been the major concern of this article, and many interesting questions pertaining to the perfectability of man and the effect that avowed ideological constructs can have on programmed
societal goal attainment require further research and discussion.
Professor Berman has succinctly summarized the lessons to be
learned from the heuristic and "parental" functions of law in the
Soviet legal system:
From the standpoint of the West, the development of Soviet law
requires a revision of some of our conceptions of the Soviet system. The popular view of the Soviet state as a police state run by
professional revolutionaries, whose actions are governed solely by
the desire to extend their own power, is a dangerous half-truth....
We may learn from the socialist character of Soviet law that
socialism is not an end in itself; nor is capitalism; and that the balance between personal initiative and social-economic integration is
one which must be struck again and again in any going legal system.... [W]e may learn from the parental character of Soviet
law the great potentialities and the grave dangers inherent in the
development of positive law as a guardian and teacher of the lawconsciousness of persons and groups.
In their focus on the parental and educational role of law, with
its conception of the litigant, the subject of law, as a youth to be
guided and trained, the Soviets have made a genuine response to
the crisis of values which threatens twentieth-century society - a
response which has not merely a Marxist and a Russian but a universal significance....
Man is not uniformly the dependent and growing youth of
Soviet law, nor is he uniformly the reasonable man of our Western
legal tradition ....
A healthy legal system must give reflection in
procedural and substantive rights and duties, at appropriate times
183 See, e.g., Goluasky, The Creative Revolutionary Role of Socialist Law in the

Period of the Comprehensive Building of Communism, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,
No. 10, 1961, translatedin 1 SoviET LAw Am GOVERNMENT, No. 1, Summer 1962,
at 13-23.
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and appropriate places, to all the various phases of man's true nature.-84
From the sociological point of view, a problem arises in attempting to determine the extent to which the legally imposed social
norms are a result of the participatory interaction between the citizenry and their legal institutions. The Soviet Government has
stressed its desire for, and the necessity of, broad public participation in the processes of the legal system. But from the paucity of
empirically observed and documented sociological investigations, it
is difficult to establish the creative and progressive effect that public
participation actually has had on the Soviet legal system and on
the "content" of the social norms which are being legally imposed.
Legal institutions - such as the courts, certain sociolegal organizations, laws, and implied sanctions - may serve many functions within a complex social system. This article has suggested a
sociological typology which tentatively divides these functions into
nine categories, which can be used to analyze modern legal systems
and to clarify certain interactional aspects of such dynamic ongoing
systems. Although the "parental" and heuristic functions of law
have been discussed in this brief outline as characteristic of the role
of law in the Soviet system, it is submitted that these same functions
exist with varying degrees of emphasis in all other modern legal
systems.
Obviously, this article has only brushed the surface of a vast
area of sociological jurisprudence where much research and comparative analysis is needed. Thurman Arnold once described the judicial
trial in Western society as a "series of object lessons and examples.
... It is the way in which society is trained in right ways of thought
and action, not by compulsion, but by parables which it interprets
'
The extent to which this statement is
and follows voluntarily."' 85
valid needs to be empirically tested. Future sociolegal research in
this general area should include a comprehensive comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the educational and heuristic use of legal
institutions in other social systems, and an analysis of the extent to
which the emphasis placed on the various functions of law within a
legal system represent a particular concept of man and of the perfect-

184 H. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 383-84. See also Berman, The Comparison of
Soviet and American Law, 34 IND. L.J. 559 (1959).
185 T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 129 (1935).
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ability of human nature. To paraphrase Rousseau: 8" Whoso would
undertake to give legal institutions to a People must work with full
consciousness that he has set himself to chatige, as it were, the very
stuff of -human nature.
I8 6 See Rousseau, The Social Contact, in SocIAL

CoNTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE,

HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 205 (G. Hopkins transl. 1962).

